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A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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EDITORIAL

The great change in public affairs brought about in the last six months is something which the Church cannot and may not neglect. We need not recount its symptoms: in politics the tragedy of Ireland; in industry the unworked mines, the silent mills, the idle ships—indeed, we know them too well and can partly envisage their remoter consequences. Yet the message of religion to our discomfiture is not easily defined. Were it so, we should hardly have had the Bishops' speeches in Convocation last May on the merits of the coal dispute. We agree with the Prime Minister (*The Times*, July 16, 1921) in regretting the partial character of those proceedings, and of others like them dealing with contemporary affairs. Far better, if practical exhortation was necessary, to make a strong appeal for what nearly everyone knows that we need—namely, honest politics in every kind of administration, industrial, municipal, national. But, indeed, we should have liked to see a different treatment altogether, and one more in line with the true horizons of faith. We venture to say that we can afford to think and speak at this time far less about the Church and about the Nation, if only we will think and speak far more about God. And it is just there, and not in economics, that we look to the Bishops for a lead. In other words, we want some theology from them. No social tonic is half so powerful as a religious idea; and the Church has plenty in her dispensary which are well adapted to times of trouble.

Thus, we might well school ourselves first of all to the elements of truth about the condition of man. For we are back at Eden's gate. No schemes of social improvement, no promises of progress as in the nature of things, no glamours of reconstruction can be anything but will-o'-the-wisps, if they neglect the essential laws which inhere in human life. Scrip-

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ture's parable alone does justice to them when it figures them as a primal curse upon sin:

> Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return. . . . Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man.

There is the rub. Work, effort, enterprise, pain—stern duty shot through with a ceaseless "nostalgia of the infinite"—that is the law of man's natural life. And we have a name for it in modern parlance. We call it Economic Necessity.

Yet the term is not the whole truth, for it forgets the "nostalgia"; and it is that which makes men sullen and rebellious and causes our social accidie, because they cannot interpret it. Or, rather, they interpret it amiss as pointing to a mitigation of the need for work, a progressive escape from the law of labour; and venturing on that path they find themselves cheated at every turn by incalculable forces. Scheme after scheme emerges, catchword after catchword, for transmuting the quicksands of contingency into the foundations of the heavenly Jerusalem; and all perish and pass. The Church's task is to offer a new way, the way of the spirit. There is no escape from Economic Necessity—that is the hard truth we must first confess. But there is an attitude to it, a penetration of it, and so an ascendancy over it, which makes all the difference. We cannot change our circumstances, but we can rise above them. We cannot conquer them, but we can conquer ourselves. And that victory is won when the interior conflict comes to utterance in the old cry, "Peccavimus—Peccavi."

Only love can evoke penitence. The outburst of penitence which accompanied the first preaching of the Gospel was not the result of a fresh presentment of the Law but of a new unveiling of God as Love. This central feature of Christian Theism is capable of becoming the theme of the most maudlin sentiment; but in trained hands its power is incomparable. Theology sustained few greater losses in the War than the death of Mr. A. C. Turner, whose essay in *Concerning Prayer*, quoted in the first article we publish below, would alone have made that volume worth publishing. Happily, as Dr. Relton's article shows, the message of that Essay is not lost, and indeed is strengthened by more explicit relation to recent philosophy. It may be summed up in one of Dr. Relton's sentences: "The Omnipotence

of Love means its competence to deal with all situations and all possibilities." And so, too, the Bishop of Manchester in *The Universality of Christ* (p. 61)*: "Does it not tell you a good deal about this universe in which we live, that love is one of the things, possibly the only thing, that can never be excluded by circumstance?"

The detailed application of this principle involves both theory and practice. On its theoretical side it is a task for Moral Theology, on its practical side for statesmen and leaders in industry. We confess to disappointment at the fact that the revived study of Moral Theology amongst us has as yet shown so few signs of a desire to cope with this part of its work. It is impossible to squeeze the methods of modern finance into the strait-waistcoat of mediæval canons of usury; and, if the space devoted to their discussion by the scholastic writers and their successors of the Reformed schools is somewhat of a rebuke to us, there is surely something more up-to-date to be said on the subject than anything we can find there. The striking Report of the Archbishops' Committee on *The Church and Industrial Problems* was no doubt a step in this direction; but one swallow does not make a spring, and it did little more than show how complex the problems are. Meanwhile, the reviews we publish below leave no doubt that we have men well equipped for helping us.

"My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." That is Christ's witness to what the Love of God means in the world; it means work; and the penitence of men who respond to it can mean no less. How fierce a light it turns upon our times! For it shows the refusal of work to be a form of atheism—a rejection of partnership in the ultimate Activity which creates and sustains the world. It is not for us to apportion the blame; but it is most emphatically ours to drive home the truth. And the truth is that a community where tens of thousands of men are idle is a community which is alienated from God. We have to assert that the sanctity of work is not something which is dependent upon its conditions, but is intrinsic in itself. So far, indeed, from bad conditions lowering its sanctity, they may glorify it, as they did in Christ's own case; for His work was consummated on the Cross and ours is to involve a cross likewise. Or rather, it is the Person who glorifies the work. And the glory which He gave to work in His Incarnate Life is transmissible to all who believe in Him. For the Christian,

* *Student Christian Movement*, 1921. 4s. net. Paper, 2s. 6d.

therefore, we may say that work "standeth not in the following of Adam," in a grudging and ill-tempered submission to necessity, but in the fellowship of Him who "because of the suffering of death" was "crowned with glory and honour."

"My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." The work of the Incarnate still finds continuance in His High Priesthood and in the derivative priesthood of the Ministry and of the whole people of God. No more illuminating exposition of the heavenly Priesthood of our Lord has been given us than Dr. Nairne's edition of *The Epistle to the Hebrews* now published in the Cambridge Bible Series.* The Introduction contains a masterly paraphrase of the thought of the whole letter, while the notes abound in apt illustration. Dr. Nairne adds his name to that increasing body of scholars who date the letter about A.D. 65 or 66, and maintain that it was addressed to a small community; but he does not commit himself as to whether or not this community was in Rome. The book is particularly valuable at the present time, when political unrest and insecurity so easily debase the currency of faith.

Dr. Nairne's book will no doubt meet with the attention it deserves at the Convention of Priests to be held this month at Oxford. The Convention is a fine experiment, and the programme of speakers and subjects gives one every confidence in its success. We think of it as fulfilling the same purpose as "refresher-courses" in the Army during the War, when officers and N.C.O.'s were withdrawn from the line for a period of intensive instruction and training. Its object is increase in efficiency. We cannot share the misgivings of those who fear that professional efficiency spells professionalism. Too often, as the legal and medical professions also testify, professionalism is a cloak for the lack of efficiency, not a result of its presence; while increased mastery of technique and method, if accompanied by a fresh grasp of principles, most commonly results in men becoming more simple, more sincere, and more humane.

* Cambridge University Press, 1921. 7s. 6d. net.

"SOME POSTULATES OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY"*

III.—THE OMNIPOTENCE OF LOVE IN RELATION TO HUMAN FREEDOM

In *Some Dogmas of Religion*, Dr. McTaggart has two interesting chapters on "God as Omnipotent" and "A Non-Omnipotent God." His treatment of these questions will form a convenient starting-point for our enquiry as to the compatibility of the Divine Sovereignty with Human Freedom, and what place, if any, there is in Christian philosophy for the concept of a "finite God."

"By God," says Dr. McTaggart, "I mean a being who is personal, supreme, and good." He then immediately proceeds to qualify this statement in a way which makes it quite clear that by God he does not mean what a Christian theist understands by the term. By "personal" Dr. McTaggart means that God is self-conscious. By "supreme" is meant "much more powerful than any other being and so powerful that his volition can profoundly affect the whole sum of existence," but *not* that he is omnipotent. By "good" is meant that at the least he is "of such a nature that he would be rightly judged to be more good than evil," but *not* that he is perfect. We should answer that this is precisely what we do *not* understand by "God," and that the name cannot rightly be applied to any being short of Omnipotent Personal Goodness. If we postulate a being less than this we are forced in mind to conceive of a greater in just those essential attributes which McTaggart's "God" fails to exhibit in their supremacy and completeness. Why does McTaggart qualify his definition in this significant way? The answer is that he starts with an *a priori* conception of what Omnipotence involves, and then sees that he cannot apply his definition to God as he conceives him.

What does McTaggart understand by Omnipotence? Omnipotent in the strict sense of the word means for him a being who "could do anything whatever."† Omnipotent with him evidently means "able to do all things." "There is nothing," he tells us, "which an omnipotent God cannot do —otherwise he would not be omnipotent."‡ "An omnipotent person is one who can do anything."§ Hence we are not surprised to find him stating in all seriousness as an argument in refutation of God's omnipotence the old question: "Could God create a being of such a nature that

* Lectures delivered at Sion College, November, 1920. First Lecture appeared in THEOLOGY, April and May, 1921.

† P. 188. ‡ P. 201. § P. 202.

he could not subsequently destroy it ?"* Whatever answer we make to this, we are told, is fatal to God's omnipotence. "If we say that he could not create such a being, then there is something that he cannot do. If we say that he can create such a being, then there is still something that he cannot do—to follow such an act of creation by an act of destruction."

What are we to say to arguments of this kind ? Simply this, that we can only judge of the meaning of Omnipotence when we take it, not in itself as an abstract proposition, but as it is revealed in a concrete form as an attribute or function of a Supreme Personality. The theist is dealing, not with naked Omnipotence, but with the Omnipotence of a Personal God whose essence is Holy Love. The Omnipotence of such a God must be spiritual through and through. It is exercised in accordance with the Nature of the Subject in whom it inheres. God's power is not that of physical force but moral and spiritual suasion. We need not labour this point, as it has been fully dealt with in recent literature upon the subject.† All we need to do is to indicate it as revealing a profounder conception of Omnipotence than anything suggested in McTaggart's treatment of the subject, and one which we believe will go far to mitigate the chief objections he finds to the thought of an Omnipotent God.

Once grasp the significance of the Omnipotence of Love as the truer conception of God's Almighty Power, and many of the difficulties which centre around the problem of human freedom in relation to God's will are seen to be of our own making, due to imperfect insight into the Christian conception of God as revealed for us in Jesus Christ. We have frankly to accept this revelation as superseding earlier and cruder notions of God's Omnipotence which appear in Old Testament pictures of the Deity as a magnified Eastern despot.

"In the Old Testament this despotic notion of God's omnipotence,"‡ writes Mr. A. C. Turner, "runs as an alien and barbarous current through the literature of love and trust. In Christianity it is melted away in the absoluteness of God's love. But men have never been able to venture themselves sufficiently in love to realize its omnipotence; and Christian theology, while it has dwelt on the love of God manifested in redemption, has never been able to free itself from the notion of compulsive power in its thought of God's creation and direction of the world."

And again, "the history of the growth of spirituality in religion is the gradual disappearance of the belief that God

* P. 204.

† *Vide, e.g.*, "Prayer and the World's Order": A. C. Turner in Essays *Concerning Prayer*, Part II. *passim*.

‡ P. 417.

exercises power of the external and compulsive kind, and the realization of the omnipotence of divine love to attain its ends without the exercise of compulsion. Love is the only form in which it is possible to figure an omnipotence which is both absolute and moral, for wherever compulsion is present the highest moral result is incompletely achieved. . . . The basis of a spiritual morality is freedom, and the morality of freedom is love."* "So the love of God is omnipotent, not as controlling and shaping the outward course of events. Love is omnipotent because it can always in any circumstances give a perfect expression of itself. It has no need to manipulate history, because it is always sufficient to meet any situation. The activity of love is self-giving; it can afford to give itself away, and no reception which it may meet can be either a limitation or a real defeat. If divine love is the author of all existence, it follows that nothing can exist wherein love cannot find expression.

"So omnipotence and freedom are complementary to one another. The freedom of the creature is not a limitation of the omnipotence of God but its expression; omnipotence is not a limitation of freedom but its ground. In terms of outward relationships this is a paradox for which there is no rational solution. But love is more than rationality; not contrary to it—indeed, it is its ground—but over and above it."† It would be an interesting study to take this profounder conception of the Omnipotence of Love and apply it to the objections which McTaggart urges at length in his chapter on "God as Omnipotent."

Is Omnipotence, for example, consistent with Personality? According to McTaggart's definition of Omnipotence, the conception of an Omnipotent Will is shown to be contradictory. Again, the usual objection urged against Perfect Personality is the fact that personality as we know it involves a Non-Ego, or, as McTaggart, following Hegel, prefers to call it, "an Other." An Omnipotent Person must, however, according to McTaggart, be capable of existing without an Other, even an Other which was not existent. Why? Because he could only be a person on condition that an Other had arisen or would some day arise—*i.e.*, it would be impossible for him to prevent the existence, some time or other, of a universe over against which he could realize his own self-existence. And a person who cannot prevent something from taking place, McTaggart reminds us, is clearly not omnipotent.

Such an argument is meaningless under our conception of what is involved in the Omnipotence of Love revealed in a

* Pp. 419-20. † P. 421.

personal life. The trinitarian doctrine of the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity enables us to grasp the profundity of the simple statement—God is Love. We have no need still further to complicate the problem by the addition of another attribute wholly alien which McTaggart seeks to graft upon his "God." God is Love, and as Mr. Turner reminds us, "to say that He is omnipotent is not to give Him an added attribute: it is equivalent to saying that love is omnipotent."*

The outstanding difficulty in accepting God's omnipotence is undoubtedly the facts of sin and suffering. These present us, indeed, with the very crux of theism. It is abundantly obvious from a reading of McTaggart's treatment of this subject that, starting as he does with his abstract conception of Omnipotence, he can never hope to show its compatibility with the presence of evil in the world. "Is Omnipotence compatible with Goodness?" he asks, and, of course, he has only to prove the presence and reality of one painful thing in the Universe to argue that an Omnipotent being is responsible for it, and to go on to show that whilst to cause or permit evil is often justifiable in a being of limited power, no such justification can apply to an Omnipotent being. How, then, can he be called good? His goodness can only be preserved at the expense of his omnipotence. Hence the conclusion for a non-omnipotent God as the only solution of the vexed problem of evil. If, however, we postulate the Omnipotence of Love, then that is compatible, as we have seen, with Human Freedom. It allows for an element of contingency as the *sine qua non* of a true ethical and spiritual activity on the part of a free created spirit. Man's freedom involves the possibility of evil and sin. God's Omnipotence deals with this fact, but the treatment is Love's method all through, involving as this does the impossibility of using physical compulsion, but only ethical and spiritual suasion. The Omnipotence of Love means its competence to deal with all situations and all possibilities. The fact that the free-will of man is the free-will of a created creator means that the total possibilities for good or evil on the part of the creature are fixed. Man can only sin within the limits of his finite being. Omnipotent love can deal, we believe, with the utmost that evil can do. Theoretically the free-will of man can resist God's will for ever. Practically the question resolves itself into the query, How long can human perverseness and stubborn self-will withstand Omnipotent Love's appeal to that in the created being which is of Divine origin, and which constitutes the deepest and the truest self of even the meanest of the sons of men? Practical

* *Op. cit.*, p. 424.

experience suggests what theory queries—viz., the final certainty of the triumph of "Love Divine, all loves excelling." This is not to make light of the appalling results of man's misuse of his freedom. It is to recognize, however, that this misuse is set within certain bounds. The power of evil is not omnipotent. If we can show that on the whole the facts of experience seem to justify a sane Christian optimism in the final triumph of goodness, we are justified in claiming that this deeper conception of Omnipotence enables us still to cling to the Sovereignty of God in spite of the tremendous force of the argument against it from the side of moral evil.

In this connection it is helpful to turn to a most illuminating discussion of the problem by Dr. Tennant in some recent articles in the *Expository Times*:* "There is something in goodness" (writes Dr. Tennant) "which promotes its conservation, and something in evil which augurs disruption and extinction, free-will notwithstanding. And this is their intrinsic nature. The apparent gains of wickedness are not consolidated; evil purposes conflict, and so conspiracy in evil is thwarted. On the other hand, there is inevitably a growing consensus of the good, and conquests in goodness are maintained. There is unity of aim, commonness of purpose and interest, between men of good-will. Good can come out of evil, but not evil out of good. The gains of good over evil are cumulative. For the higher the moral tone of the many, the harder to realize and the more obviously evil become the evil inclinations of the few. It is no easy optimism, therefore, on which we rely, but the intrinsic nature of goodness and evil, when we indulge the hope that the moral progress of mankind which history hitherto records will proceed in future ages. And if this be so, the objection that a God, who is not omnipotent in the sense that for Him possibility and impossibility are alike, is inadequate to secure the ultimate triumph of goodness loses its force. We have no need in this connection to appeal to divine omnipotence in any sense other than that which alone we have found to be reasonable and meaningful: for it is in virtue of God being what He is that goodness and evil are what they intrinsically are, while it is in virtue of their being what they are that the one is destined to prevail over the other."

I do not wish in the least to minimize the strength of the argument against theism which arises from the appalling fact of moral evil and suffering. So powerful is its appeal that a strong tendency in modern philosophical thought is driven to take refuge in the concept of a finite God as the only method of reconciliation. So brilliant and keen a theologian

* *Expository Times*, October, 1919, "Divine Omnipotence."

and philosopher as Dr. Rashdall presents the case for a "finite god" in a way which is a standing rebuke to the shallow optimism of much Christian opinion on this subject based upon an inadequate appreciation of the full force of the argument against the Goodness of God presented to our finite minds by the sad spectacle of the travail of the whole creation in pain and suffering, and still more by the moral corruption of and its devastating effects in our distracted human nature. It is, however, because so much is at stake for theism in the acceptance or rejection of the concept of a "finite god" that, in spite of the powerful stimulus which this thought has received as the result of the War, and its wide appeal to the popular mind in the cruder forms in which it has been clothed in the writings of Mr. Wells,* none the less we do well to explore every avenue of escape before committing ourselves to a conception which to my mind is subversive of the very essence of the Christian doctrine. Against it we postulate the Omnipotence of Love, believing that in this thought there is a way of escape which enables us to preserve at once the Sovereignty of God and the adequacy of His method of dealing with the problem of finite creation and the freedom of man. The existence of finite selves, their relative freedom for ethical and spiritual development, the conditions inherent in the possibilities of such a development, the providential government of the world for this end, and the security for the final consummation of the Divine purpose worked out in co-operation with Omnipotent Love—all these issues are at stake in the acceptance or rejection of the Divine Omnipotence. We do well, therefore, to probe its depths to the utmost of our ability in the effort to understand its content before we reject it in favour of another theory which, whilst it solves some of our intellectual difficulties, raises others, and in any case strikes a fatal blow at a root conviction of the religious consciousness—viz., the Sovereignty of God.

The conception of a "finite" God, whilst it commends itself to some thinkers as a helpful solution of the problem of evil and the dark mystery of suffering, yet is fatal to a consistent doctrine of God. The absolute sovereignty of God is challenged by the concept, and we do well to bear in mind the implications involved in the Divine Omnipotence. The acceptance of a "finite god" as the god of religion is in itself a fatal undermining of religious experience, and it is difficult not to believe that once a half-doubt as to the god's ability to cope with the problems of the universe is introduced, the religious experience of communion and the pouring out of our

* *Mr. Britling sees it Through, God the Invisible King.*

troubles and perplexities into his ear will lose their vitality, and embrace an element of uncertainty and unreality. Faith's dependence, which is the very nerve of religious experience, rests ultimately upon the unshakable assurance of God's Omnipotent Love. If we cannot depend upon a "finite god" in the ultimate issue, we shall inevitably begin the search afresh for Someone or Something stronger and more reliable. We are driven behind the "struggling" god to a greater "Invisible King" or "Veiled One," an Inscrutable Fate to which we do well to pay homage.

Again, God's Omnipotence brings with it an assurance of a final consummation of Love's purpose which cannot be frustrated. The end is assured only if the Worker is absolute sovereign. Christian theism can allow for an element of contingency in the process of the working out of the Divine plan—there is room for reverses, cataclysms, pain, and suffering in the redemptive process by which the Sovereign God leads a free creation to its final goal and secures a free ethical response to His sovereign will and purpose; but faith is bankrupt in the hands of a "finite god" who may fail ultimately. We should have no guarantee that the whole world-process in his hands might not get so out of gear as to end in irretrievable and final disaster. The belief in the Divine Omnipotence is the only sure ground for a sane optimism, the only sure deliverance from a hopeless pessimism as we survey the world to-day in its seeming chaotic state and its bewildering clash of interests and aims. It is only the knowledge of "our Father which art *in Heaven*" that can steady us in the day of calamity and bid us cling in hope to the certainty of a better day.

Given a "finite god" who is doing his best, and we may as well acquiesce in a half-doubt as to the meaning of life's struggle, and console ourselves in moral failure with the self-complacency which makes "god" after its own image and pities him without condemning itself. The sovereignty of God is crucial, and Calvinism has still a message on this point in an age of sentimentality.

If "the line of least resistance, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once,"* we can only say that the issues at stake for Christian theism forbid any such escape from our difficulties. For theology the harder path must be chosen, and even at the cost of consistency we must still postulate an Absolute God, in spite of John Mill's assurance

* William James, *Pluralistic Universe*, p. 311.

that if we would retain God as a religious object we must give up the notion of His Omnipotence. Far from this being the case, we may with some confidence affirm that religious experience would suffer if we had to worship a non-Absolute god, one whose "will has to struggle with conditions not imposed on that will by itself,"* one who "tolerates provisionally what he has not created, and then with endless patience tries to overcome it and live it down"—one, in short, who "has a history."

Moral Freedom.

When we come to the problem of moral and spiritual growth, we are the more confirmed in our belief in the Personality of God. It is pre-eminently in the realm of religious experience that we learn (*a*) the character of the God we worship, (*b*) the purpose and goal of our creation, (*c*) the conditions of growth and development of the finite human spirit.

If God is Love and the purpose of Omnipotent Love is the creation of finite spirits like ourselves in order that we may freely respond to that Love and grow into His likeness, it follows that we must have such a measure of freedom and independence as to make possible such a response. Freedom is the *sine qua non* of moral and spiritual growth. The ethical efficacy of an act lies in its voluntary character. We can only achieve something in the realm of ethical and spiritual values if we are free. Such freedom is the necessary condition of any growth for a moral and spiritual being akin to God and created in order to grow and develop into true sonship. Moral responsibility is meaningless apart from such a measure of human freedom as we know ourselves to possess, but which a pantheistic philosophy and a deterministic science would delude us into imagining that we lacked.

Christian theism finds room for human freedom in ethical and spiritual activity within God. Were we part of God in any ontological sense such freedom would be meaningless. We should be reduced to automata, strings pulled by the All-embracing One. The doctrine, however, of the Divine Immanence, as we have seen, leaves room for the free movement of the finite spirit within the environment of God in whom we live, and in whose service is perfect freedom. This may be a paradox and an antinomy for the intellect, but it is a commonplace in the realm of actual experience, and notably in the realm of religious experience.

"I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me," is a verdict which is found compatible with the Apostolic

* James, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

injunction, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God that worketh in you." There is a co-operation of the human with the Divine which is secured, not by physical compulsion, but by moral suasion and the methods which Omnipotent Love alone can employ. If all theory rules for the incompatibility of Divine Omnipotence and human free will, all experience confirms the verdict of practical life in its varied activities, that within the limits of our finite nature and its conditioned being we are free to do the will of God and free to refuse. Doing His will we find that we act in accordance with the deepest and best needs of our nature and obey the laws of our inmost being. We experience in this a joy and a blessedness not otherwise obtainable, and we grow and develop into a personality so real as to suggest limitless possibilities of a higher becoming. The problem of the Divine transcendence and immanence, equally with the problem of human freedom and dependence, whilst theoretically insoluble, is practically solved in human experience in the reality of the Divine Grace men are conscious of receiving and their knowledge of their freedom to accept or reject it. The Divine Transcendence is our security that it is GOD that worketh in us; the Divine Immanence is our assurance that in Him *we* live and move and have our being. The reception of *His* Grace proves our dependence, *our* reception proves our freedom. We receive His Life to make it our own by a free act which none the less is the response of a nature He so made as to fulfil the law of its being in that act and that act alone. So it is that, freely willing, we will in accordance with His will. He wills in us and through us since He made us. In virtue of His Immanent Grace it is God that worketh in us, both to will and to do according to His good pleasure. In virtue of the measure of freedom we have received from Him we work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. Hence, the sublime paradox which is none the less a truth of Christian experience: *Deo servire est libertas.*

Pantheism fails to substantiate personality, human and Divine. Christian theism is truer to human experience as we know it when it seeks to do justice to both.

We have contended for the absolute Sovereignty of God and a measure of human freedom. Does this mean that there is by God's permission an element of contingency in the working out of His eternal purpose? A Christian philosophy may grant as much.

We may accept William James's idea of the universe as a really dangerous and adventurous place, and regard it as Divinely constituted as a training school for the development

of character. We are here for one purpose—viz., the achievement of something in the sphere of ethical and spiritual values, something, *i.e.*, in the only sphere in which we have the guarantee that our work will abide. There must be room in the universe for free creative activity, the power of self-determination on the part of created creators, free within the limits of their created nature, environment, and gifts, and within the larger purpose of God for the well-being of all in the ultimate issue.

Is, then, the whole world-process foreseen and predetermined? The answer is that there can be *no* uncertainty concerning the final end, but *much* concerning the actual working out of the process.

One of the most helpful treatments of this problem will be found in Professor Ward's *Realm of Ends*, in which he repudiates the thought of the whole temporal order being like an infinite symphony which the Absolute knows at once, and in which therefore evolution is a kind of mere rehearsal *after* the symphony is composed. On the contrary, Professor Ward offers a *via media* which Christian theism postulates: "*All* is not decreed; the world is not created like a symphony. Again, *all* possibilities are *not* left open. The many have not severally unlimited freedom, that 'freedom of indifference' which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creators, the Pluralist maintains: their nature is partly His doing, partly their own: He assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open to everyone: none are left with no talent at all. The *total* possibilities, then, however far back we go, are fixed; but within these, contingencies, however far forward we go, are open."

It follows that God in one sense does not know what is going to happen in the world to-morrow, since the actions of created creators are within certain fixed limits within their own control and outside His by a self-limitation on His part. Yet He is above surprise. When He made us and gave us the gift of limited freedom, He knew the utmost limits of the misuse to which that freedom could be put. He anticipated the worst that evil could do, and knew at the same time that evil's worst could not finally frustrate His eternal purpose. He is, therefore, equal to the worst that can happen, and adequate so to deal with it as to overrule it all to His glory and the achievement of His end. The certainty of His final victory He enables us to discern in the very nature of Good and Evil in human beings. He has so created us that Good has survival value, Evil has not. And the reason for this lies in His own

Nature, which is Goodness. Hence Goodness in us, wherever achieved, partakes of the eternal and abiding.

Further, the exact course of the world's history is not fixed. There is an element of contingency. There may be and have been already delays, advances, and retreats. Goodness has received and may yet receive setbacks. The progress of the world has not been and need not be a uniform advance in ethical and spiritual achievement on the part of the sons of men. There have been and still may be temporary triumphs of Evil over Good.

Further, the achievement of His purpose is conditional upon our free co-operation with Him. It is within the power of men in any generation greatly to further or sadly to retard the progress of His Kingdom. Hence the summons to every age to a real conflict, a real enterprise, a great adventure in co-operation with Him against all that hinders and temporarily frustrates the final consummation of His purpose. Were we all in this age to bend our wills to His obedience and yield ourselves as willing servants to His will, there be some amongst us who should not taste of death till they had seen the Kingdom of God come with power.

It means, further, that the course of human history might have been so different, and that it lies within our power to make it in the future other than it has been. In this sense the sons of God are summoned to a great crusade, and to all men of good-will is the assurance never wholly absent from the religious consciousness that we are fighting on the winning side. The victory is His already, and will be ours, notwithstanding the worst that evil can do.

In this way a Christian philosophy can attempt to show how, whilst the whole is determined, there is yet room for an element of contingency in the working out of the Divine plan. And we can see, moreover, why such should be the case. Moral and spiritual value attaches to our acts only in virtue of the fact that they are the result of self-conscious choice. True freedom is thus found in spiritual sonship, and the method of Omnipotent Love is to work in and through the sons of God. Hence, as Augustine put it, "Man without God cannot, God without man will not." *Qui fecit te sine te, non salvabit te sine te.* Whilst, then, we have "the melancholy power of baffling the Divine good-will," and may continue to do so possibly to our own eternal loss, God's purpose of Love for His creation cannot finally fail. He has all eternity in which to work and an infinite patience which must outlast our rebellious will.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, and with the

reminder that the argument from analogy depends upon the amount of truth in the resemblance, we may, in conclusion, quote a brilliant illustration of Professor James's:

"Suppose two men before a chess-board, the one a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The expert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee exactly what any one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the *possible* moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined form of checkmate to the novice's king."

H. Maurice Relton.

(*To be continued.*)

THE ORIGIN AND FALL OF MAN

The sermon preached by Canon Barnes before the British Association last year has reopened the question of the relation of modern anthropological research to the traditional doctrine of the Fall. The voluminous correspondence in the press testifies to the need in our day for a restatement of the Christian dogma of a forfeited Paradise and a lost state of innocence, to readjust it with the facts of human history. Therefore it would seem that the time has arrived for an investigation of the problem in the light of the latest scientific data at our disposal.

That man is a product of mammalian evolution is so generally accepted by well-informed people that the proposition may be taken as a postulate.* Because expert opinion is by no means unanimous as to the precise course taken in the transition from the simian to the human stage of development, or because widely different dates are assigned to the antiquity of man, it must not be supposed that there is any doubt among those who are qualified to speak on the subject that the origin of the human race is to be sought among the Primates.

It is now generally agreed that man emerged from the vast geologic history of the earth in the period known as the Pliocene, or, according to some authorities, very early in the succeeding Pleistocene or Glacial epoch. The order Primates includes the Lemurs (Strepsirrhini); the New World monkeys (Platyrrhini);

* W. L. H. Duckworth, *Prehistoric Man* (Cambridge, 1912); A. Keith, *Ancient Types of Mankind* (London, 1918); F. Wood-Jones, *The Problem of Man's Ancestry* (London, 1918); E. O. James, *An Introduction to Anthropology* (London, 1919).

the Old World monkeys (Catarrhini); the anthropoid apes (Catarrhini) and man. *Tarsius*, the most primitive of all the non-lemurine Primates, though generally included in the Strepsirrhini group, is better regarded as a monkey belonging to a class by itself, since it differs so markedly from the lemurs. The resemblance between the two species is merely due to their both representing very primitive arboreal mammalian stocks, but there is no evidence that the Strepsirrhini are ancestral to the monkey group, or to man. The phylum, or stem, from which the human race is derived is that known as Anthropoidea or Haplorrhini, which includes the anthropoid apes, the monkeys, *Tarsius*, and man. An examination of the skulls and skeletons of these various species shows certain points of resemblance and certain points of differentiation in the four types of Primates. The skeleton of the gorilla is not at all human in appearance, although it possesses every bone that is present in the human body. The skull of a young gorilla, before it has developed its massive brow ridges, is remarkably like that of man. In the adult orang these ridges are intermediate in size, and in the chimpanzee they are distinctly smaller than in the gorilla. The gibbons have the same bones set together in the same order, but the proportions are different. In certain features they are related to the Old World monkeys, in others to those of the New World.

When we come to examine the human skull we find that certain primitive features are present which do not occur in that of either the ape or the monkey. The articulation of the bones in the base of the human skull and on the sides of the cranium is characteristic of the primitive mammal and the lemur, and not of the anthropoid and the monkey. Similarly, the teeth, nasal bones, the jugal bone, the structure of the back wall of the orbit, etc., have all preserved primitive features in the human skull which are not to be found in the case of the apes and monkeys. Again, the notorious vermiform appendix, the existence of which in the human body is often brought before man in a startling manner, is an organ which is usually regarded as vestigial. In the gorilla it is very much longer than in man, while in monkeys the cæcum terminates below in a blunt conical point. In the lemurs, on the other hand, a true appendix is found similar to that in the human body. It would therefore seem that man has retained a primitive feature which has become specialized in the monkeys.

Numerous other examples could be quoted to prove that the human body is in many respects more primitive in structure than that of the anthropoids and the monkeys. It would therefore appear that the Haplorrhini must have arisen from a common ancestral stock far back in the Miocene—how many

millions of years ago we dare not hazard a guess. There is no evidence of the existence of any big form of Primate earlier than the Miocene period, and therefore there is every reason to suppose that it was during the early part of this period that the order was evolved. *Tarsius* dates back, in the form of *Anaptomorphus*, to the beginning of the Eocene period, and in the strata of the next epoch—the Oligocene—a fossil monkey, *Propliopithecus*, has been recovered from the deposits of the Egyptian desert. This latter creature has almost human dentition, the canines being weakly developed and the incisors (front teeth) and the premolars being perpendicular in position. It seems unlikely that the hypothetical " proto-men " were in existence as early as the Oligocene, but *Propliopithecus* certainly appears to possess the characteristics that we should expect to find in a more distant common ancestor. In the next geological period (the Miocene) remains of the large fossil anthropoids occur in France, Germany, and India, of which the earliest is the kind now named *Dryopithecus*. At a still earlier date in the same period we know that anthropoids similar in shape and size to the modern gibbons were in existence, but there is no evidence of any great anthropoids older than the Miocene. A generalized type of extinct ape, named *Palæopithecus*, related to the chimpanzee, the gorilla, and the gibbon, with upper premolars resembling those of man, has been recovered from the fossil-beds of the North of India (Siwalik), a deposit which geologists regard as having been formed in the Pliocene.

The recent discovery of definitely human remains in a narrow deposit at Piltdown, in Sussex, in association with the bones of several animals which lived in the Pliocene period, throws considerable light on the problem of man's ancestry. The site of this epoch-making discovery is situated in a shady avenue leading to Barkham Manor, a short distance from a beautiful piece of Sussex moorland—Piltdown Common—eight miles north of Lewes. In a shallow stratum of river-gravel, less than 4 feet in depth, near the Manor, Mr. Dawson procured an unusually thick human parietal bone, and various other parts of the skull.* In the same deposit a number of rudely chipped pieces of flint—commonly called " eoliths "—were found together with some unworn Palæolithic implements of the so-called " Chellean " type, and various animal remains. The two Pliocene animals—*Elephas meridionalis* and the mastodon—were in a waterworn condition, like the eoliths, and thus prove that the gravel was partly composed of the remains of some Pliocene deposit, probably a higher and older gravel of

* *Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society*, March, 1913, vol. xix., p. 117.

the River Ouse. Judging from the fact that the human bones show no signs of being waterworn, the skull appears to be contemporaneous with the Palæolithic flint implements. If this assumption is correct, the age of *Eoanthropus Dawsoni*, as the skeleton has been named, should be fixed as early Pleistocene (*i.e.*, at the beginning of the Glacial period). On the other hand, it must be remembered that Mr. Reid Moir (who has made a careful study of early forms of flint implements) assigns "the more Palæolithic looking specimens" (*i.e.*, the flints) to a period preceding the "Chelles" phase.* In this case the Piltdown skull belongs to an intermediate period between the Pliocene eoliths and the early Pleistocene palæoliths. Professor Keith would even go so far as definitely to assign *Eoanthropus* to the Pliocene.†

For our present purpose we may leave the precise date of the remains an "open question." Expert opinion is agreed that *Eoanthropus* lived either at the end of the Pliocene or the very beginning of the Pleistocene. The skeleton therefore takes us back to the age to which the well-known *Pithecanthropus* is usually assigned. But the most cursory glance at a cast of these two early types of fossil-man will show the enormous difference between their physical features. *Pithecanthropus* (the ape-man found at Trinil, in Java) is a creature with an extremely low receding forehead, prominent brow-ridges, a small cranial capacity and other ape-like features. *Eoanthropus*, on the other hand, has a cranial capacity variously estimated at from 1,100 c.c. (Elliot Smith) to 1,397 c.c. (Keith), a very high forehead, feebly developed brow-ridges: in short, a thoroughly human-shaped skull, resembling in some respects modern man. The jaw is chinless, and has been compared by Dr. Smith Woodward to that of a young chimpanzee. Thus *Eoanthropus* represents a new genus combining a distinctly human cranium with an ape's jaw. It is therefore rightly placed by Dr. Woodward in a class by itself with a distinctive name.‡

As we have already had occasion to show, there is a difference of expert opinion regarding the brain capacity of the Piltdown skull. Smith Woodward's original estimate of 1,070 c.c. has been criticized by Keith, who maintains that when the two sides of the skull are properly restored and made symmetrical a cranial capacity of 1,397 c.c. is obtained.§ According to this reconstruction, the Piltdown skull compares favourably with the average brain capacity of the female skulls found in the

* J. Reid Moir, *Pre-Palæolithic Man* (Ipswich, 1919), pp. 60 *ff.*
† *The Antiquity of Man* (London, 1916), pp. 306 *ff.*
‡ *Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society*, March, 1913.
§ *Antiquity of Man*, p. 390.

plague pits of Whitechapel (1,300 c.c.). If the sex of *Eoanthropus* is female, as is generally supposed, then the male members of the Piltdown race must have had a cranial capacity (on this estimate) of 1,550 c.c.—an amount equal to the average capacity of modern Europeans.*

Of course, it must not be supposed that the size of the brain is a criterion of the intellectual capacity of its contents. Nevertheless, as Elliot Smith has shown, a brain must reach a certain weight—950 grammes or 1,000 c.c. in volume—before it can become the seat of even a low form of human intelligence. Growth in volume continues till a certain maximum weight is reached; then *development* takes the place of growth, the brain elements entering into more and more complex relations with each other without much increase in size or number. If 950 grammes in weight or 1,000 c.c. in volume represents the point of growth at which human intelligence begins, *Pithecanthropus*, with a cranial capacity of 850 c.c., falls below the human level, while *Eoanthropus*, even on the lowest estimate, is above it, though "microcephalic." Here, then, we have at the end of the Pliocene or the beginning of the Pleistocene, an individual who, as regards mere size of brain, was apparently well within the human standard. But can we be certain that *Eoanthropus* had human intelligence?

Now we know that it is in the prefrontal region of the brain that the higher mental faculties are centred. It was not until 1861, when Broca published his paper, *Sur le Siège de la Faculté du langage articulé*, that the theory of special localization of functions in the brain began to be definitely established. The mass of evidence that has now been collected has shown that special mental functions or capacities are dependent upon certain localized areas or regions of the upper brain. The centres of consciousness, intelligence, and will, as distinct from the centres for reflex and automatic movements, are located in the cortex. They are usually classified as sensory centres, motor centres, and association centres. Of the sensory centres the centre for sight is situated in the *occipital lobe* around the calcarine fissures; that for hearing in the first and second convolutions of the *temporo-sphenoidal lobe;* that for smell in the *limbic lobe;* and that for general cutaneous sensibility, perhaps, about the *Rolandic zone*. But this last-named centre, like that for taste, is a matter of dispute among anatomists. The motor centres also lie about the fissure of Rolando in the ascending frontal convolution, and part of the first, second, and third frontal convolution. The centres for the movement of the

* Dr. Woodward is now coming round to the same view regarding the capacity of the skull, since he now estimates it at nearly 1,300 c.c.

head, trunk, and leg lie from the front of the brain backwards to the fissure of Rolando; and those of the shoulder, arm, hand, and face from the top downwards towards the fissure of Sylvius. The power of abstraction or generalization is the basis of intelligence. This implies that in the synthesis of diverse sensations and memories into ideas and thoughts an increasing number of connections are laid down between the regions. Since the frontal lobes form the largest and most extensive of the intermediary regions, they may be regarded as the centre of intelligence. This conclusion is supported by the fact that stupidity and dementia follow from the degeneration of this area, and that it is here that the human cranium differs from that of the lower animals.

It was not until the brain and hand had reached the required point in evolution that the forces of natural selection established more definitely the erect attitude, liberating the hand to become the chief instrument in man's further progress, and the means of stimulating the motor centres of the growing brain. Then it was that the prefrontal area began to develop. The adoption of the erect attitude *alone* cannot have transformed the ancestor into a human being, otherwise the gibbon would have become man in Miocene times. Obviously it was the steady growth and specialization of the brain that was the fundamental factor in the evolution of the human organism, the liberation of the hands being the result of mental development. Nevertheless, once the erect attitude was assumed, the use of the hands would act as a tremendous stimulus to cerebral growth. The action and reaction between hand and brain is shown by the discovery that one of the best methods of developing the mind of the child is by the constant use of the hands. In the anthropoids the opposable thumb, with its power of bringing the thumb against each of the fingers, is absent, which prevented their using their hands for skilled work, thus depriving them of a powerful stimulus to cerebral development. In *Pithecanthropus*, who had a free use of his hands, it was undeveloped, which suggests that the creature was of low intelligence despite the well-developed sensory areas of touch, taste, and vision. The same applies, in a less marked degree, to so-called *Neanderthal man*, who inhabited Europe in the Cave period (*i.e.*, the middle period in the Palæolithic or Old Stone Age), although, in the volume of cerebral matter, the brain is nearly as large as that of modern man.

The prefrontal region in the Neanderthals is not fully developed, but has a protuberance as in the brain of the anthropoids. The left frontal lobe in particular, which is associated with the power of speech, is not much developed in the lower

part, so that a *limited* power of speech is inferred. In the human brain the inferior or third frontal convolution is expanded so as to reach back to the stem of the fissure of Sylvius, forming the anterior boundary of the stem, this new orbital part of the frontal lobe being associated with the faculty of speech. In Keith's reconstruction of the Piltdown brain, the third frontal convolution reaches the human standard, while in Smith Woodward's cast the orbital surface of the convolutions is even more prominent.* It would therefore appear that *Eoanthropus* had well emerged from the state of the "dumb animal."

In view of these facts, we conclude that at the beginning of the Pleistocene at least one individual (*Eoanthropus*) had human intelligence, and was capable of exercising the higher human faculties. To what state of cerebral development and specialization the brain had reached when the human ancestor emerged from the common precursor it is impossible to say. If, as we believe, the origin of man was the result of the coincident development of four lines of structural evolution—the growth and specialization of the brain resulting in the assumption of the erect attitude, the development of the opposable thumb, and the acquisition of the power of speech—the prohuman member of the human stock would probably be an animal with a mental development very unlike that of *Pithecanthropus*, and having more of the human primitiveness about its body than goes to the making of a modern anthropoid ape. It seems that the orang, the chimpanzee, and the gorilla are not ancestral forms of man, but the more unenterprising Primates who failed to attain human cerebral development.† The same applies to *Pithecanthropus*, which apparently represents an evolution (or perhaps we should say a degeneration) on lines of its own. In our opinion, therefore, the human race is an extremely ancient type, distinguished now, and differentiated from the beginning, from the rest of the Primates by a superior mental capacity.

Having set forth our view of the problem of man's ancestry, we propose in our next article to examine the bearings of these findings on the theological doctrine of the origin and fall of man.

E. O. James.

* *The Antiquity of Man*, p. 411.
† Wood-Jones, *The Problem of Man's Ancestry*.

(*To be concluded.*)

CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY*

"Where lies the land to which the ship would go?
Far, far ahead, is all her seamen know.
And where the land she travels from? Away,
Far, far behind, is all that they can say."

So wrote the poet Clough in 1852. He admits his failure to answer the questions he asks, and, in the year following the Great Exhibition which had (see *The Times* leading articles of that date) inaugurated the era of universal peace, his readers were probably content to leave the questions open. To-day, when, after seventy more years of full steam ahead, our *Titanic* of civilization has quite obviously run among the icebergs, we all clamour for an answer—to the first question, at any rate. The historically-minded tell us that if we would know "whither" we must first know "whence." Hence the striking output of popular "philosophies of history" that have followed the end of the war. Mr. Wells, starting with the nebula and passing in animated review the solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short existence of *Pithecanthropus* and his successors, points forward to a United States of the World, "based upon a common world religion, very much simplified and universalized and better understood. This will not be Christianity nor Islam nor Buddhism nor any such specialized form of religion, but religion itself pure and undefiled: the Eightfold Way, the Kingdom of Heaven, brotherhood, creative service, and self-forgetfulness." Mr. Hyndman, on the other hand, in his *The Evolution of Revolution*, starts from an idealized primitive communism, reminiscent of Rousseau rather than of Hobbes. This communism was based, it is true, on cannibalism; but the cannibalism of the savage was a cleaner and honester thing than most later forms of exploitation, just as we have to-day less reason to be ashamed of our treatment of our oxen than of our treatment of our horses. Mr. Hyndman sees history as a cycle of exploitations working round from primitive tribal communism, based on cannibalism, through the slave-owning, the feudal, and the capitalist individualisms, towards a higher world-communism from which exploitation will be eliminated.

It appears that Mr. Bernard Shaw will also enter the philosophic fray† with a tetralogy, in which the first drama presents Methuselah, and the last our remote descendant who will have recovered Methuselah's secret of longevity. Of this work no more can be said at present than that it is certain

* *Europe and the Faith*, by H. Belloc (Constable and Co.; 17s. 6d.); *The Political Aspects of Saint Augustine's "City of God,"* by J. N. Figgis (Longmans, Green and Co.; 7s. 6d.).

† I write in April, 1921.

to prove delightful and suggestive to those who can understand it, and exasperating to those who cannot.

Mr. Belloc does not find it necessary to go back so far. His concern is only with "Europe," with "Rome," with "the Catholic Faith," which three terms he finds to be synonymous. The Roman Empire, in his philosophy, is the foundation of civilization in its secular aspects. Within that Empire there grows the Catholic Church—"not an opinion, nor a fashion, nor a philosophy, nor a theory, nor a habit, but a clearly delineated body corporate based on numerous exact doctrines." The Roman Empire is not "conquered" by barbarian "invaders." The invaders are contemptible alike in quantity and quality. Rome does not die: it is changed. Politically, centralization gradually gives place to a loose federal system in which the real rulers are the "reges," the Romanized-barbarian chieftains who hold military command in the provincial Roman garrisons. Meanwhile the Empire has accepted the Faith, and the unifying principle, without ceasing to be political, becomes preponderantly religious. The secular order decays, and so we pass imperceptibly into the long sleep—or rather, as Mr. Belloc rightly says, the long siege—of the Dark Ages, wherein Rome defends herself against the onslaught of Northern barbarism and Arabic Orientalism. In this long struggle Africa and Syria and most of Spain were lost: Germany was nominally gained. "It was an experiment," says Mr. Belloc, "this creation of the Germanies by Western culture, this spiritual colonization of a *March* beyond the limits of the Empire. It did not completely succeed, as the Reformation proves."

So we pass, with Hildebrand, the Normans, and the Crusades, to the fine flowering of the Middle Ages. "An intense and living appetite for truth, a perception of reality invigorated these generations. They saw what was before them and called things by their names. Never was political and social formula less divorced from fact, never was the mass of our civilization better welded . . . and in spite of all this the thing did not endure!"

The Black Death emaciated the body of Christendom. The too strong wine of the Renascence intoxicated it. Peoples worshipped Kings, and Kings worshipped Machiavelli. And so, in the sixteenth and *not* in the fifth century, came the real barbarian invasion. "What we call 'the Reformation' was essentially the reaction of the barbaric, the ill-tutored, and the isolated places external to the old and deep-rooted Roman civilization, against the influences of that civilization . . . the turning back of that tide of Roman culture which for seven hundred years had set steadily forward . . . a sort of protest

by the conquered against a moral and intellectual superiority which offended them." The semi-barbarian Germans without were joined, from different motives, by the profiteers and *nouveaux riches* within the old Roman pale: of such were the Huguenots. "Nevertheless, even with such allies barbarism would have failed, the Reformation would be to-day but an historical episode without fruit, Europe would still be Christendom, had not there been added the decisive factor of all—which was the separation of Britain . . . because Britain alone of those who departed was Roman, and therefore capable of endurance and increase."

Britain is the villain of Mr. Belloc's piece, and two chapters are devoted to its separate consideration. The first establishes that Britain never really ceased to be Roman in the Dark Ages, and overthrows the Anglo-Saxon myths of Freeman and Green. The second explains "the defection of Britain" as due to the fact that England had already gone a long way on the road to squirearchy and plutocracy when Henry VIII.'s divorce unwittingly let the enemy pass within the gates.

From the Reformation have come (i) capitalism with its corollary, exploitation; (ii) Prussianism, or the corruption of the principle of authority until it is confused with mere force; (iii) scepticism, with its corollaries, superstition and credulity; (iv) "the progressive extension of despair."

The conclusion is: "Europe must return to the Faith, or she will perish." The Faith, be it remembered, means the Roman Catholic organization. Mr. Belloc does not tell us which conclusion he would forecast.

Such is the Catholic philosophy of history as stated by its latest exponent. As a piece of literary work Mr. Belloc's book is a masterpiece. When the historian of English Literature is in a position to view from a distance the first quarter of the twentieth century, he will remark on the varied excellence of the prose of that epoch, and, along with Mr. Conrad, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wells, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Chesterton, and several others, Mr. Belloc's name will take a high place. Any man of ordinary intelligence might read idly and rapidly through this book and then put pen to paper and, without the aid of a single note, reproduce with tolerable completeness the whole argument of the book on a scale considerably larger than the present article. To say this is very high praise. The book is "as good as a novel." In a way it is also as bad. Like a novelist, Mr. Belloc is in possession of certitude with regard to everything that he requires for his plot, and he ignores everything that would spoil the symmetry of the achievement.

Of course, it is easy to be annoyed. Mr. Belloc is arrogant;

but his arrogance is magnificent; it is in the grand style. Both for its merits and its defects his treatment of the Protestants deserves to be compared with Gibbon's treatment of the early Christians, and it was Newman, was it not, who said that Gibbon was our greatest ecclesiastical historian? Also, he is unfair, and particularly to that *alma mater* of which he is so ungrateful a son. He lashes Oxford for the errors of Freeman and Green. Yet the present writer used, fifteen years ago, to hear the mythology of Green's *Making of England* exposed by Mr. Ernest Barker in an Oxford lecture-room as trenchantly as by Mr. Belloc himself, and the present Master of Balliol's *Church and State in the Middle Ages* accepts the Papacy as the greatest instrument for good in all history, and appreciates the idealism of the thirteenth century in terms more balanced and accurate but as eloquent as those of Mr. Belloc. And, of course, he is artful. Mr. Belloc claims to be, not an advocate but a mere witness: so also did Shakespeare's Antony call himself "a plain blunt man."

With regard to the conclusion—Europe must return to the Roman Catholic organization or she will perish—we all know, or think we know, the answer. "She may perish: probably she will not perish; but she will not return."

It is interesting to turn from the latest and perhaps the most brilliant to the first and certainly the most influential exponent of the Catholic philosophy of history—from St. Hilary of Sussex to St. Augustine of Hippo, more particularly his *De Civitate Dei*, the political aspects of which were expounded by Dr. Figgis in a course of "Pringle Stewart" lectures delivered not long before his death. The circumstances of the two Apologies were not altogether unlike. The occasion of each was the breaking up of a long period of prosperity—the Victorian and the Roman. As Dr. Figgis points out, "Augustine's life was passed in a series of changes like those which divide the jubilees of Queen Victoria from the silver wedding of her grandson." He writes to rebut the charge that Christianity has ruined Rome; but he goes farther and proves that Christianity alone can now save her. Had he written, as in intent he does, "Europe must hold fast by the Faith, by Rome, or she will perish," he would have been right.

Dr. Figgis's book is much less easy to grasp than Mr. Belloc's. The author is, as always, learned, scrupulous, and balanced; himself a man of prodigious learning, he assumes a degree of learning in the reader that embarrasses even while it gratifies. We need not go to him for a Bowdlerized Augustine, adapted for immediate application to twentieth-century problems. It is well to be made to feel, especially after reading Mr. Belloc,

the extreme *difficulty* of history, the difficulty of entering into the mind of the past. Particularly is this valuable in the case of a writer like Augustine, whose texts have been used as missiles on every side of every ecclesiastical controversy.

In part, then, the difficulty of the study is due to the scrupulous fairness of the lecturer; but still more is it due to the nature of his subject. The constructive part of *The City of God* (which follows a criticism of pagan polytheism and of Greek philosophy) is based on an antithesis between the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas terrena*, their origins, their course in time, and their consummation in eternity. Now what does Augustine mean by these two terms? It ought to be easy to answer, but as a matter of fact it is not, and entirely contradictory answers have been given by different scholars, the reason being that Augustine himself uses his terms for different purposes in different places.

Dr. Figgis says Augustine is "too great to be consistent." This seems to the present writer a perverse statement. No doubt Augustine is great, and greater in his inconsistency than writers who achieve consistency by mistaking a part for the whole. None the less, his inconsistency is a subtraction from his greatness. He would have been greater still if, while realizing the complexity in his subject, he had avoided confusion in his treatment of it.

Augustine alternates between a spiritual and a political use of his terms. In some parts of his treatise the *Civitas Dei* is the Church, an organization hierarchically constituted; as Mr. Belloc says, "not an opinion, nor a fashion, nor a philosophy, nor a theory, nor a habit, but a clearly delineated body corporate." Over against this is the *Civitas terrena*, the secular organization, which, though necessarily imperfect and serving only temporary purposes, is ordained of God for a special purpose in this world. It is in this use of the antithesis that Augustine marks an advance on (or a declension from) Origen, whose emphasis is on Christianity as doctrine and as *ethos* rather than on the Catholic Church. On this side *The City of God* is the corner-stone of the Papal edifice of Gregory VII. and Innocent III.

But in other parts of the work the *Civitas Dei* has become something very different. "The *Civitas Dei*," writes Dr. Figgis, "is to be found long before the visible Church existed, even before the call of Abraham. Augustine speaks of the good and the evil as mystically two cities, stressing the word "mystical." The primary distinction is between two societies, the body of the "reprobate" and the *communio sanctorum:* not between Church and State. . . . On earth these two bodies are intermingled and always will be. Only partially and for certain

purposes is the *Civitas terrena* represented by any earthly polity. The Church represents the *Civitas Dei* rather by symbol than by identification. . . . Error has arisen by identifying *sans phrase* the *Civitas terrena* with the State as such, and by taking every predicate applied to the *Civitas Dei* as obviously intended for the Church Militant. It would be less inaccurate to represent it, in the familiar phrase, as the conflict between the Church and the World. Yet even this would not be right. The real division is one which will be made manifest at the Last Judgment, and not till then. All earthly distinctions are but the symbols, never adequate, of the final grouping into sheep and goats. Members of either body are found, and always will be found, in the terrene representative of the other. It is the superiority of other-worldly interests to those of this world which is the gist of all. . . . The *Civitas Dei* is the body of the elect, many of whom are to be found in pre-Christian times or in heathen peoples—while from this body many among the baptized will be excluded."

No wonder Augustine has been cited by both sides in religious controversies. Mr. Belloc's admirable lucidity enables us to illustrate the two voices of *The City of God*. He takes the case of the *anima naturaliter Christiana*, and imagines him saying: "For my part, I have come to make it a sort of rule to act as this man Christ would have had me act. He seems to me to have led the most perfect life I ever read of, and the practical maxims which are attached to his name seem to me a sufficient guide to life. That is the groove into which I have fallen, and I do not think I shall ever leave it." Would this man, Mr. Belloc asks, have been regarded as a Christian in the third century either by the Church or by its persecutors? He answers, no doubt rightly, in the negative. But would such a man have been a citizen of Augustine's *Civitas Dei?* The answer is both "Yes" and "No"—"No," if we appeal to one set of passages; "Yes," if we appeal to another.

The two lines of thought which Augustine was able to hold together and even to confuse have diverged far to-day. One leads to the Christianity of Mr. Belloc, the other to the Christianity of Mr. Wells, so much quoted to-day from "Protestant" pulpits; and what these two Christians, if Mr. Wells will forgive the appellation, think of one another's Christianity has been illustrated with regrettable vividness in recent issues of the *London Mercury*.

For Christianity is the most important single element in the latter half of Mr. Wells's famous *Outline*. His Christ (whom Mr. Belloc dismissed, if we remember the phrase aright, as a milk-and-water nineteenth-century idealist) is delineated with

an enthusiasm only just this side idolatry. He is a preacher of the true religion of human brotherhood; his teaching is "extraordinarily like" that of Mo Ti, a Chinaman of the fourth century B.C. "There was much in the teachings of Jesus that a rich man or a priest or a trader or an imperial official or any ordinary respectable citizen could not accept without the most revolutionary changes in his way of living, yet there was nothing that a follower of the actual teaching of Gautama Sakya might not receive very readily, nothing to prevent a primitive Buddhist from being also a Nazarene. . . . The essential identity is the most important historical aspect of these great world-religions . . . it is their defects, their accumulations and excrescences, their differences of language and phrase, that cause the rivalry."

Mo Ti and company are presumably admitted to Augustine's *Civitas Dei* by one of its gates, though the other is locked against them. A few months ago the Rev. R. L. Sheppard, of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, in a newspaper interview, stated (very truly) that this country was looking in vain for a Christian statesman, and he hastened to add that by a Christian statesman he did not mean a member of his own or any other "Church," but one who, whatever his theological beliefs, would apply the Christian *ethic* to the political controversies of the day. He appealed to five Liberal or Labour newspapers (but not, apparently, to any "Church" papers) to assist him in this quest. A faithful disciple of Mo Ti, if such can be found, will presumably serve Mr. Sheppard's purpose.

We have here, then, two rival philosophies of history, both of which attach supreme value to something they identify with Christianity. The philosophy of Mr. Wells sees the only cure of the ills of society in the triumph of the Christian spirit of "brotherhood, creative service, and self-forgetfulness." The theology and the organization of the Church from the time of St. Paul onwards he views as the successful conspiracy of priestcraft to stifle Christianity. Mr. Belloc, on the other hand, dislikes and avoids the very term Christianity. "Christianity," he writes, "is a term in the mouth and upon the pen of a post-Reformation writer: it connotes an opinion or a theory; a point of view; an idea. The Christians of the third century had no such conception. Upon the contrary, they were attached to its very antithesis. They were attached to the conception of a *thing:* of an organized body instituted for a definite end, disciplined in a definite way, and remarkable for the possession of a definite and concrete doctrine." In fact, what Mr. Wells regards as the excrescence is for Mr. Belloc the essence, and what Mr. Wells regards as the essence is by Mr. Belloc ignored or taken for granted. On the human character and the human

teaching of Christ, of "brotherhood, creative service, and self-forgetfulness," he has indeed very little to say, though we have no intention of implying that he does not personally attach supreme importance to the matter.

To sum up with the aid of a violent metaphor: The two halves of the brain of the author of *The City of God* were imperfectly connected, and the schools represented in England to-day by Mr. Belloc and Mr. Wells have each of them seized upon one half and run off with it in opposite directions. A sound philosophy of history will bring together again the two halves and effect an organic connection between them. Our philosophic Christian historian of the future will be a super-Augustine, a thinker with Augustine's breadth but without his inconsistency. He will achieve a higher synthesis in which the discords represented by the controversy between Mr. Wells and Mr. Belloc will be resolved. He will not say that centralized organization and unity of doctrine and practice is everything, nor will he say that it is nothing and worse than nothing, but he will estimate rightly both its value and its limitations. He will not unduly exalt nor unduly despise the contribution of Rome, or of Wittenberg, or of Geneva, or of those great Free-thinkers who have in all the ages served Christ by attacking His (so-called) Churches. Nor will he, like Mr. Belloc, class the Modernists in a casual footnote with the Mormons and the Adamites and a self-styled Messiah he met in 1891 in Colorado.

Such a philosophic historian would find his task impossible to-day. We are in the middle, not at the end of an epoch. Such a book as we have in mind could no more be written to-day than a history of the Russian Revolution could be written to-day or a history of the Prussian Empire in 1906. Such a history, however, when it comes to be written, may well find that the date 1920 is an important one, not only on account of the publications of Mr. Belloc and Mr. Wells, but also on account of the Report of the Lambeth Conference. It would be foolish to idealize that document. Its mellifluous reticence marks its official origin and forcibly reminds us that Episcopacy is in England the first cousin of the Civil Service. None the less, in its method of approach to the problem of reunion, in its recognition that the road to unity of aim lies through the recognition of diversity of method, in its genuine even though not quite successful attempt to appreciate and yet avoid patronizing Christian Science, Theosophy and Spiritualism, the Report is more liberal than the liberalism of Mr. Wells, and certainly more catholic than the Catholicism of Mr. Belloc.

D. C. Somervell.

THE PARABLE OF THE TARES

THE parable of "The Tares among the Wheat" has proved almost as difficult to interpret and as varied in interpretation as that of "The Unjust Steward." It has been thought to teach that the evil will always be found to be mingled with the good in the Church, and that therefore all premature attempts to separate the two are to be deprecated. It has constantly been used as a missionary subject because our Lord in it declares that "the field is the world," and has been thought by it to urge us to persevere in missionary endeavours in spite of the failures in some parts of the field.

But such interpretations, though possibly included in the teaching of the parable, do not cover its main purpose.

It would seem to be important, in attempting to find a full interpretation, to take into consideration the context and circumstances of the parable. We note that St. Matthew places it in conjunction with six other parables. All seven parables deal, in prophetic anticipation, with the fortunes of "the Kingdom of Heaven." It was this that our Lord had come to announce and to manifest. He was and He is the embodiment of it. "The Kingdom of Heaven" may be described as the truth of the nearness and reality of God. Christ taught and manifested this, and is this truth. The parable of "The Sower" declares that this truth must be personally appropriated by individual hearts and lives. The Kingdom begins with the individual. That truth to be fruitful requires that certain obstacles should be overcome. The parable of "The Sower" shows the need for rightful dispositions. The parable of "The Mustard Seed" tells of the widespread external growth and consequences of this truth in the world, beyond the expectations created by its small and secret beginning. The parable of "The Leaven" speaks of its sure, silent, unseen, and permeating influence in the world. The parable of "The Hidden Treasure" tells of the Kingdom's value when suddenly discovered, and of the effort necessary to possess it personally; while that of "The Pearl of Great Price" tells of its surpassing value and beauty, amidst much else that is attractive and worth having. The parable of "The Draw-Net" foretells the all-embracing sweep of the Kingdom, and of the mixed elements which enter into it, and the final purging and severance of bad and good after the closest and most unerring scrutiny.

But what is the teaching of the parable of "The Tares among the Wheat"? If the striking grouping and the order

of these parables mean anything, then, perhaps, this parable teaches a rather different lesson from what it is usually thought to do.

Commonly, as I have said, it is supposed to teach the lesson that in this world we are to expect that in the Church the evil will always be mingled with the good; that premature and rough attempts to expel those who may appear to be tares by those who regard themselves as wheat are to be discouraged. In a sentence, the true Church is not, and never will be in this world, co-terminous with the visible Church. The Judgment Day alone can declare who of those *in* the Church are really *of* the Church.

If this be its teaching, how does the lesson differ from that of "The Draw-Net"? That lesson would seem to come as a fitting close to the series of lessons in the seven parables. Such a lesson is premature and out of the true order in the sequence in the second parable of the seven. No; just as the parable of "The Sower" foretells the obstacles to the good seed bearing fruit in the hearts and lives of *individuals*, so the parable of "The Wheat and Tares," very naturally, follows on to foretell the dangers surrounding the good seed *in the world* generally.

Here comes in the force of our Lord's declaration, "the field is the world." The field, be it noted, is not the Church. To declare that "the field is the world" was prophetic of how the good seed, the Kingdom, the truth of the nearness and reality of God, should be spread throughout the world. The Kingdom was to be catholic, not national, although it would begin with individuals. The sons of the Kingdom were to be cosmopolitan, not racial, and drawn from individuals of all nations.

But, though this was true, the sons of the Kingdom had to learn the difficult lesson that the good seed sown by the Son of Man in the world would not be always and everywhere triumphant. How was it that, since Christ had come to destroy the works of the devil—how was it that, if He had "bruised the serpent's head," the serpent was yet active and powerful?

The Apostles—the early believers—even as present-day Christians are, might have been a little disheartened when they found opposition and rejection, falling away and hypocrisy, wickedness rearing its head with all its enormity and ferocity, in spite of the sowing of the good seed, but for the warning of this parable. The failure of Ananias and Sapphira, *e.g.*, must have been a great shock to the Apostles after the Kingdom had spread so rapidly. St. Peter, however, knew that alongside of the progress of the good and true there would also be the sowing of the bad. Without hesitation he recognized the work of an enemy and traced it to its true source: "Why hath Satan

filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost ?" (Acts v. 3). These were St. Peter's words about the matter.

No. The sowing of the good seed only awakens the anger of the enemy. He knows that his power is broken, that a stronger than he has come upon him; but he makes a desperate attempt to keep that which was never, by right, his. So, when the Apostles went out into the world charged with their message, they believed in it, loved it, and were ready to die for it. When they found, as they did find, that the forces of evil did not scatter at their bidding, even in spite of the harvest of Pentecost; when they found hardness, rejection, opposition, and failure—what was to save them from despair or discouragement ? Very naturally, they might ask anxiously and in surprise, " Sir, didst Thou not sow good seed in Thy field ? Whence, then, hath it tares ?" Whence, then, after all our efforts—whence, then, after such wonderful sowing—whence, then, after all the Saviour's love and suffering—whence, then, this fruitlessness, this failure, at the moment when fruit might be expected ? Can it be that the good seed is not really good ? Can it be that we have been deceived in thinking that to be all-powerful which by experience and use proves to be sometimes weak ? No, no, indeed ! The answer is, and the owner of the field knows it—nay, expects it: " An enemy hath done this." The answer is that the devil's power is not completely destroyed. A principle of its destruction has come into the world. Man's freewill has not been taken from him. He is still open to either the influence of the good seed of the Son of Man or to the tares which the devil sows wherever and whensoever the wheat has been sown. Men may still become, even though the Kingdom is and has come and been announced by the Saviour, " sons of the evil one." But, as never before, the possibility of becoming, the power to become, " sons of the Kingdom " is within their reach.

Now we can see what, perhaps, is implied in the question of the servants: " Sir, didst not thou sow good seed in thy field ? Whence, then, hath it tares ?" There is surprise, there is an element of shock, there is a shade of shaking or wavering, after the battle has begun, and when there has been some repulse. The servants, zealous for their master's honour, find this the first great trial. In their anxiety they naturally appeal to him for an explanation. They find him calm and prepared—he knows: " An enemy hath done this." In his calmness they learn also to be calm, and to be strong with his strength.

But then there arises another question: " Wilt thou, then, that we go and gather them up ?" Being interpreted, that means: " Wilt Thou, then, that we make no peace with them ?

Wilt Thou, then, that we cast them out as impossible of amendment? Wilt Thou that we allow them no longer to be in touch with the wheat? Wilt Thou that we look upon them as useless and profitless, and as mere cumberers of the ground?" The answer is calm, certain, clear, and unmistakable: "Nay, lest while ye gather up the tares ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest." Are you sure that you can distinguish between them? How can you do so, since the tares in their early growth are so like the wheat? That which looks to *you* so like the tares in its early showing, may, after all, when it comes to fruit, prove to be wheat. In your zeal for My good, have you sufficiently realized and considered the awful consequences of rooting out, getting rid of and abandoning, what looks to you like tares?

Nay, "let both grow together until the harvest." Then, the fruit is unmistakably seen and known. Then, the true character of the plant is declared, when the ears of tares contain the black and useless grains instead of the rich and golden corn. Then, the reapers shall execute My orders with unerring judgment. Then, the tares shall prove their worthlessness and the wheat its fitness for My barns!

With this interpretation of the parable the early Church might have found a source of inexhaustible comfort and strength. The Gospel was not long in the world before both preachers and adherents must have felt the need of some such comforting assurance on which to fall back. One can imagine St. Paul pondering on the meaning of this parable when he wrote to the Galatians or the Corinthians, and perhaps it weighed with him in his later attitude to John Mark. We recall, too, such sayings of the Lord as St. Matt. xxiv. 12: "Because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold," or St. Luke xviii. 8: "When the Son of man cometh, shall He find faith on the earth?" or St. Matt. xxiv. 13: "He that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved."

Such texts plainly declare that some might be tempted to ask a little despondently, "Sir, didst Thou not sow good seed in Thy field? Whence, then, hath it tares?"

We know the danger that surrounds us from prevailing indifference. Our Lord has not led us to suppose that we shall find the good seed everywhere triumphant. Rather He teaches us that evil shall become more and more apparent as the good becomes more evident. The shade is always more noticeable as the light becomes brighter. Do not let us be carried away by the influence of those who tell us that the good seed is not as good as we thought.

We shall not be caught in the wiles of the devil, who would

try to persuade us that Christian Science or Theosophy or Spiritualism is what is really needed to improve "the field." The good seed has triumphed in the past in spite of the tares sown by the enemy. There are greater triumphs yet in store for it.

But the parable warns us against hardness and want of sympathy with those whom we may be tempted to regard as tares. We are not to give up any as hopeless. We are not to put down any class or any individuals as past possible fruitfulness. We need a boundless love and charity and superhuman tenderness.

If our own experience is recalled, we shall remember that the growth of tares and wheat is closely akin. After all, both in Nature and in Grace wheat is only improved tares! It requires great patience, much practice, long cultivation and care for the wheat to become good and fruitful wheat. Tares—or, rather, what look like tares—are constantly proving themselves to be in reality wheat, under Divine grace and blessing.

The parable, too, supplies us with inspiring motives for efforts to reach those who, in the end, seem to be in danger of proving tares. Obviously, to be a tare at the Harvest means to suffer loss—a loss so terrible that it is described under the image of a furnace of fire, and produces the wailing and gnashing of teeth of bitter remorse. Clearly the husbandman in the parable restrained the zeal of his servants because they had not quite realized what the rooting out of the tares might mean for them. Clearly the Son of Man has sown good seed in the world at such tremendous cost in order to save those who will have it so from something which in terribleness must correspond to the cost at which He sowed it.

Are there not three great dangers before a Christian to-day? Either he may become despondent and doubtful about the power of the Gospel, because he sees some failure around him. Or he may become hard and unsympathetic towards those who differ from him and cannot see the light as he sees it. Or he may grow slack in his efforts and desires to help those who at present are outside of a living Christianity. To all these three attitudes the parable seems to have something to say. Our Lord seems to have prophetically taken them into account and provided an antidote, as He describes in parable "the fortunes" of the Kingdom of Heaven in the *World*.

HUBERT G. HOUSEMAN.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The names of the writers of the series of Papers for the Priesthood which we begin this month will be sufficient introduction for them. We regret having to postpone until next month the fourth section of these papers, which will deal with the civic relations of the Priesthood. The writer is Miss A. M. Deane, O.B.E., who has been for many years associated with the Church of St. Mary Redcliffe at Bristol; and her recent promotion to the Chief Inspectorship of Women's Work under the Ministry of Labour has necessitated this short delay in the publication of her first article. The purpose of the section is information as to those parts of our social machinery with which the clergy are most commonly brought in contact in their pastoral work.

The Document from Canada which we publish below has been kindly sent to us by the Bishop of Montreal; and we hope that others of a similar kind may follow in due course from other parts of the world. It is the first suggested form of reciprocal recognition which we have seen, and it deserves careful study. We propose to return to it in a later number, and shall be glad to receive any expressions of opinion on it which may be sent to us.

Attention has recently been called in the correspondence columns of the *Church Times* to a forthcoming article by Dr. Cuthbert Atchley on the *Epiclesis*. We intend to publish this next month, together with an article by Fr. Trenholme, S.S.J.E., on "The Canon of the Liturgy."

Oremus.

For Ireland.

O Christ, Who by a Cross of love didst turn the counsels of sin and hate into the healing of the world, proclaim, we beseech Thee, to the peoples of our islands the things which belong to their true peace; that they rise with a single mind to forgive past wrong, to repent present bitterness, and to remember only their unity in Thee and Thy kingdom of love, Who livest . . .

PAPERS FOR THE PRIESTHOOD

A.—DEVOTION

By Rev. W. B. Trevelyan, formerly Warden of Liddon House

It is, perhaps, well for many priests that when, in answer to the question put to them in Ordination, "Will you be diligent in prayers, and in reading of the holy Scriptures, and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same?" they reply, "I will endeavour myself so to do, the Lord being my

helper," they realize but dimly what the promise involves. It is so simple in prospect, so hard in actual experience. Yet in most cases the period of their diaconate must have brought enlightenment. If all priests to whom deacons are entrusted realized their duty, all might be well. It could easily be made clear, for instance, that normally the newly ordained deacon was expected to have his mornings to himself—that to visit, or to admit visitors, was the abnormal thing. How well we know the parish priest, driven almost to distraction by the multiplicity of calls made upon his time, who allows his deacon to be swept into a vortex of external activities without a protest. It is hard to blame him; but the results are often disastrous.

The whole efficacy of a man's ministry as a priest depends really upon his inner life. It is not what we say or do that is effective, but what we are: not so much activity, as character, that tells. Those words of our Lord to Pilate have still their application: "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of Me?" Is our knowledge of our Lord second-hand? Is it what we have gathered from textbooks, or is it really our own? Does it come over us, or through us? The safest guides are those who can say, "Now we believe, not because of thy word, for we have heard Him ourselves."

By far the greater part of the disasters that occur through our ineffective ministrations to the sick and dying, our weak and pointless sermons, the invertebrate advice we give to our penitents, is due to this want of personal knowledge. Our power to help others depends far less upon our knowledge of theology than upon our personal relation to God, and our experienced realization of what our union with Him implies and involves.

Baron von Hügel, in his *Mystical Element of Religion*, makes it clear that the mere acceptance of institutional religion, or the intellectual grasp of its meaning and demands, though essential, is insufficient. "All higher religion ever is personal and revelational. It has, as the manifestation of an infinite Personality, a certain fixity, and demands entire and unconditional surrender. But this it asks in a person towards a Person, a surrender to be achieved not in some thing but in Some One—a Some One Who *is* at all only inasmuch as He is living, loving, growing; and to be performed, not towards some thing but towards Some One, Whose right, indeed Whose every power, to claim me, consists precisely in that He is Himself absolutely, infinitely, and actually what I am but derivatively, finitely, and potentially." Hence the necessity of "true growth and indefinite expansion." Thus, though the revelation is always the same, it is inexhaustible and ever fresh in its demands, "as truly fresh as if it were a fresh revelation."

Most of us know only too well the intense difficulty of ever keeping any such ideal as this in view, our strange distaste for prayer, our shrinking from the effort it involves, our unhappy tendency to slip back into spiritual sloth. And we know, too, that this is the real secret of our inability to help others; for it is quite certain that we cannot hand on to them what we do not ourselves possess; we cannot help others to know Him Who is "the Way" unless we ourselves are at least doing our utmost to follow Him. Slow enough, blind enough, "dull of hearing" we may be, but at least we need not fail through lack of desire or effort. Nor must we fail others in their need. At any time we may have to advise or help those who are probably far beyond us in knowledge of the inner

ife: we shall make strange blunders if we ourselves know nothing of it; and there is, at any rate, one thing that we can all do—we can study the map of that spiritual life, even if we are slow and halting in our own exploration of it.

It is a comfort to realize how largely unanimous the saints are in what they tell us of the secrets of the life of prayer. There is much they cannot tell us at all, because it cannot be expressed in human language; but as to what is essential, they are in wonderful accord. We might, for instance, take Father Baker's *Holy Wisdom* as a groundwork for study, and as we go on to read other books, find that we not only have nothing to unlearn, but that in all that matters most, the later and perhaps lesser writers only teach what we have already learnt.

Some effort shall be made, however inadequately, in succeeding papers to explore what spiritual writers have told us of prayer, meditation, and the like. However far off we may be from reaching the standard of such men, we may at least be stirred to fresh and hopeful effort.

B.—IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

I.—PRELIMINARY

"Will you be diligent . . . in reading of the holy Scriptures, and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same, laying aside the study of the world and the flesh?" Few of us can read this part of the Ordination Service without feeling uncomfortable. We do study to some extent, but is "diligent" a fitting epithet? Would not "perfunctory" be more appropriate?

The Editor of Theology has asked me to write some articles likely to help the clergy in being faithful to their vow of study. To apologize for accepting is unnecessary—he would not have asked me without a cause. But it is due to myself to define carefully my qualifications and strictly limited aim. Not being a professional scholar, I can sympathize with the difficulties of busy parish priests. In the stress of a much occupied life I can but rarely find time for systematic and continued study. Nothing but a painfully acquired habit of using odds and ends of time enables me to "keep up" at all. I realize that for me at least slackness in this matter would mean spiritual as well as mental retrogression.

As to standpoint and aim, this can best be defined by visualizing an imaginary reader. Slackers can be ruled out; they will not be readers of this journal. The real scholars can take care of themselves without the elementary hints which are all I am qualified to offer. I think, therefore, of a man of forty who just missed second-class honours at the University. He began his ministry well, worked among the young and visited with great devotion, became a fluent preacher, renewed his spiritual vitality at an annual retreat, and has read many theological books sitting in an armchair or on journeys. His ministry is a real gift to the Church, yet he is beginning to feel stale. His earlier sermons, crude as they seem in retrospect, had the freshness and attractiveness of youth; he is losing this without any compensating development in mature power. When subjects like Biblical Criticism, the Fall of Man, or the Atonement come to be discussed by thoughtful laymen in his congregation, he feels debarred

from preaching about them from lack of knowledge. Like others of his age, he notes a loss of that joyousness in prayer which once was his. He knows enough about psychology not to be unduly worried, but wishes that the compensating gains were more evident.

Now, such a man needs one thing above all others—to gird up the loins of his mind and to do some hard intellectual work. In all probability he has still some twenty-five or thirty years in front of him of active work in the priesthood, and it is fully worth while to lay solid foundations for the future and form habits which will be an asset in later middle life. The mental refreshment will react in many directions upon his spiritual life. Spiritual staleness is a foe which may be dealt with by other than frontal attack.

Let us suppose such a man feeling the need of a new start and wishing to replenish his stock of theology. He resolves to start again, and, like St. Ignatius in his old age, to begin to be a disciple of Christ, Who is the Truth. It would be wise for him to form a modest scheme of study—a *minima inchoationis regula* ("a little rule for beginners") as St. Benedict said of his Rule. You can always extend your rule: to relax it is disheartening.

We suggest, then, one hour a day, or six hours a week—a deficiency on one day being made good in the same week: the hour to be one of real study undertaken for its own sake, preparation of sermons and lessons and the reading of books, however stiff, in armchairs not being counted as study. Such reading is necessary as well as pleasant. But let us define real study as sitting or standing at a desk with not less than two books in front of us and a pen in our hand. The book studied and a notebook in constant use are the irreducible minimum.

Many students find work unsatisfactory which leads to no definite and visible result. To write at least one book is their ambition, but the difficulty of getting scholarly work published discourages them. No priest need feel paralyzed by such considerations. Every hour of honest theological toil is making him better equipped for his task of teaching. His sermons will become far easier as a result of a systematic course of study. Instead of having to search for subjects, his difficulty will be to find time and opportunities for passing on to his people all the fruitful lines of thought on which his mind has been working. But the hour of theological study should be regarded as indirect, not direct, preparation for sermons.

Next month we hope to give some elementary hints about ways and means, methods and books. After that must come articles on Bible study. The question in the Ordination of Priests divides our studies into two parts—the Bible and what helps to the knowledge of the Bible. All Church history and theology may be regarded as coming under the latter head. Many "disciplines" are being pressed upon the clergy now—political science, sociology, and the like—which may be regarded as on the border line between theology and "the study of the world" which we have eschewed. It will probably be wise to warn these off as intruders and keep the hour sacred for strictly theological subjects. An intelligent man picks up a working knowledge of such matters as he goes about the world: it is theology in the strict sense for which the best hours of the priest's life need to be rescued.

C.—PASTORAL WORK

By Rev. J. J. G. Stockley, Rector of Wolverhampton

I.—VISITING

I suppose that all priests who have been in Holy Orders for some years are conscious of a certain feeling of shame (if not of guilt) when they think of their visiting. No one is satisfied that he has done nearly enough in this way, and most of us are dimly conscious how unintelligent, irreligious, formal, and useless much of what we *have* done has been.

In this short paper I will merely remind my brethren of the clergy of (1) the Obligation of Visiting, (2) the Aim of Visiting, and (3) then consider the best practical Method or Methods of Visiting.

1. *The Obligation.*

The Catholic Church has, from her divine Lord, a mission to the whole world, and every Catholic priest who has the cure of souls has a mission to the people in a certain area or in a particular group or institution. This solemn obligation of the pastorate was laid upon us all when we were ordained. These are the words the Bishop then said to us:

"And now again we exhort you, in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you have in remembrance, into how high a dignity, and to how weighty an Office and Charge ye are called: that is to say, to be Messengers, Watchmen, and Stewards of the Lord; to teach, and to premonish, to feed and provide for the Lord's family; to seek for Christ's sheep that are dispersed abroad, and for his children who are in the midst of this naughty world, that they may be saved through Christ for ever.

"Have always therefore printed in your remembrance, how great a treasure is committed to your charge. For they are the sheep of Christ, which he bought with his death, and for whom he shed his blood. The Church and Congregation whom you must serve, is his Spouse and his Body. And if it shall happen the same Church, or any Member thereof, to take any hurt or hindrance by reason of your negligence, ye know the greatness of the fault, and also the horrible punishment that will ensue. Wherefore consider with yourselves the end of your Ministry towards the children of God, towards the Spouse and Body of Christ; and see that you never cease your labour, your care and diligence, until you have done all that lieth in you, according to your bounden duty, to bring all such as are or shall be committed to your charge, unto that agreement in the faith and knowledge of God, and to that ripeness and perfectness of age in Christ, that there be no place left among you, either for error in religion, or for viciousness in life."

The obligation, then, is clear and complete. It is an obligation laid upon us for the whole period of the sacerdotal life. It can never be put on one side for any social experiment or worldly reason. No priest has any right to decide for himself that "visiting is not his rôle," or that "he can spend his time more profitably in other ways," or that "visiting doesn't pay." It is not a question of personal preference as to what we like to do, or as to what we think we are best fitted for. No. We have, in the most solemn manner and at the most solemn moment of our lives, accepted this charge from the Great Shepherd, Jesus Christ. And there is therefore only one choice we can make in the matter—to be faithful or unfaithful.

2. *The Aim of Visiting.*

It is plain (1) that the immediate aim of all pastoral visiting, whether to the sick, to the bereaved, to the troubled, as well as to normally healthy people, is to become acquainted with individual men and women so that we may afterwards be the living and effective instruments of their conversion and sanctification. For our pastorate is a serious calling. It is not our own possession; it is a part of our stewardship. We are pastors, not for self-pleasing, not for our own advantage, but we are tending the sheep for Him Who said: "I am the Good Shepherd and know My sheep and am known of Mine."

It cannot be too often pressed on our consciences that unless a priest knows his people it will, in the end, be found impossible to influence them deeply. We may have excellent organizations, and the preachers in our churches may be fervent, and acceptable to the people. But for the building up of the Body of Christ, the spiritual temple of converted and sanctified souls, personal touch, understanding, sympathy, love—these are needed, and these must be freely and even lavishly given. Never, indeed, more than now, when disillusioned men and women are craving for light and guidance in the midst of a world that has lost its way.

(2) And so the real aim, the true purpose of visiting is the conversion of souls to Christ and bringing them into living and conscious union with Him through the sacramental system of the Church, His Body.

It is unhappily true that there has been an extraordinary amount of mechanical and soulless visiting done in the Anglican Church. Men have prided themselves on the number of visits they have paid in a particular day or week, and have—seemingly—almost forgotten the high and noble purpose of their pastorate. I was once told by an average and kindly layman of the middle classes that he greatly admired Mr. So-and-so (the Vicar of his parish)—"He visited me again and again when I was ill," he said, "and never once mentioned religion. He was a splendid man." (The layman in question has never to my knowledge practised any form of religion.)

This, of course, is an extreme and unusual case. But it is this sort of visiting that has done the harm. It has been hurtful in two ways. First, it has produced a deplorable reaction from which we are now suffering. Many young priests hardly visit at all, because they are so utterly disgusted with the Anglican tradition of formal visiting. I blame them, because they have chosen the easy way of allowing the abuse of what is good and essential to take away the rightful use. What they should do is to rely on the guidance of the Divine Spirit of Hope and Love, leave unworthy and bad traditions behind, and go forth to bring Jesus to the people and the people to Jesus.

And, then, it is the mechanical and formal visiting—surely there is a good deal of it still!—which has so often prevented the Church of England's claim to be a *religious* society being taken seriously. It has been "liked" because it has represented a rather cultivated form of neighbourly considerateness. It is hardly, in certain circles (even now), thought of as a Church proclaiming that "the Word of God is living and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12).

Yes, it is so easy in our facile pastorate to forget the tremendous import of what we bring to God's people. We bear with us the message of God's infinite Love in the potent mysteries of the Incarnation, Atone-

ment, and Resurrection of the Lord. Bethlehem and Calvary should be the ever-present pictures in the heart of the true pastor of souls.

Visiting, then, becomes a genuine religious work if the priest will only remember why he visits. To some it will always be a delight, and to some it will always be arduous in the extreme. But to all of us the question Father Dolling used to put to the clergy he influenced is the question that really matters—"*Do you love your people?*"

3. *Methods of Visiting.*

Are we to visit house-to-house? or are we to adopt some other plan of becoming acquainted with our people? How many visits should we pay in a day? in a week?

These questions can only be answered rightly by differentiating (i.) country from town parishes, (ii.) small town parishes from (iii.) large town parishes.

(i.) In country parishes or in any parish with a population of under 1,000 the Rector or Vicar can visit every house effectively and can get to know all his people well. He can do much more. He can actually fulfil the duties of his pastorate—convert, guide, watch over, and build up the souls committed to his care. Some will, of course, reject his ministry, but in many such parishes the great majority of the people can, I feel convinced, be brought (under grace) to "the unity of the Faith and the knowledge of the Son of God" through the persevering efforts of a brave and devoted parish priest.

(ii. and iii.) In the smaller town parishes where there are as a maximum two clergy working among a population of not more than 3,000 much the same may hold good. House-to-house visiting can be genuinely carried out, though there must obviously be delegation of duties, and thorough personal attention may not be possible in all cases.

It may, however, be true that in these parishes—and certainly in the larger town parishes—visiting should generally be from the centre to the circumference of Church life. What I mean is this: The priests should first visit and get to know the Church officials and workers of all kinds; then the Communicants; then the parents of the day-school, Sunday-school, and Catechism; and then the other people in the parochial area. There must a strong centre, and fire at the heart.

This method is, I have no doubt, the right one in large parishes, for religion is "caught" as well as taught, and, in my experience, lay people often "catch" religion at first from other lay people—and not usually from their clergy. *They* come in later, when their office is understood and their sacred ministrations welcomed. Therefore, the priests in charge of our great parishes need not be discouraged by the vastness of the work. They can begin by thoroughly visiting and evangelizing the (comparatively) few who will be living witnesses to others of the power of God.

In conclusion, I would like to say to young priests at the beginning of their ministry—Visit. Visit, house-to-house when possible, but visit regularly and intelligently at all events. Be ready to learn, from older priests and from your own ripening experience, how to make your pastorate a pastorate with power for Christ and His Church. Always remember that you represent Christ, and not yourself. Be thoroughly human. And, above all, pray that God may give you that gift of gifts—a heart of love for the people He saved, who are, so many of them, without the vital knowledge of that salvation until it is brought to them through you and your fellow-messengers.

DOCUMENT

REPORT OF CONFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE OF THE PRESBYTERY OF MONTREAL ON THE REUNION OF THE CHURCHES IN RELATION TO THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE AND A SIMILAR COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE BISHOP OF MONTREAL.

The following is a list of the members of the two Committees:

1. *Presbyterian.*

Chairman: Rev. Professor Welsh.

Principal Fraser.	Rev. Dr. Hanson.	Rev. A. S. Ross.
Professor A. R. Gordon.	Rev. A. G. McKinnon.	Dr. G. A. Berwick.
Rev. Dr. Clarke.	Rev. J. B. Maclean.	Mr. W. S. Leslie.
Rev. Dr. Dickie.	Rev. S. T. Martin.	Dr. D. A. Murray.
Rev. Dr. Duncan.	Rev. E. J. Rattee.	Mr. James Roger.

2. *Anglican.*

Chairman: The Bishop of Montreal.

Archdeacon Paterson Smyth.	Canon Almond.	Rev. A. H. Moore.
Canon Rexford.	Rev. Dr. Abbott-Smith.	Rev. R. K. Naylor.
Canon Horsey.	Rev. Dr. Howard.	Rev. R. Y. Overing.
Canon Willis.	Rev. J. E. Fee.	Chancellor Davidson.
Canon Shatford.	Rev. W. H. Davison.	Professor H. A. Smith.

The Conference was organized under the joint chairmanship of Bishop Farthing and Professor Welsh, and Dr. D. A. Murray and Dr. O. W. Howard were appointed joint secretaries.

There were five Conferences held, on the following dates: January 28, February 11, March 4, May 17, and May 20.

It having been agreed to consider first questions of *Faith* and then to pass to the subject of *Order*, the following Resolutions were successively adopted by the Conference:

I. Faith.

That the Lambeth Statement represents the view of this Conference—namely:

"We believe that the visible unity of the Church will be found to involve the wholehearted acceptance of—

"The Holy Scriptures, as the record of God's revelation of Himself to man, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith, and the Creed commonly called Nicene, as the sufficient statement of the Christian Faith, and either it or the Apostles' Creed as the Baptismal confession of belief.

"The divinely instituted sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Communion, as expressing for all the corporate life of the whole fellowship in and with Christ.

"A ministry acknowledged by every part of the Church as possessing

not only the inward call of the Spirit, but also the commission of Christ and the authority of the whole body." (*Lambeth Report*, p. 28, Sec. VI.)

II. Order.

The following Resolution, dealing with Sections VII. and VIII., pp. 28 and 29, was adopted:

"In view of the ultimate ideal of a reunited Christendom a representative and constitutional Episcopate, co-ordinated with Synodical, Presbyterial, and Congregational representation, is adapted to the achievement of the larger unity."

At the third conference the following Resolution was submitted, but not formally adopted. A joint subcommittee was appointed to deal with the same, the text of which is here given, as it formed the basis for subsequent discussion and action:

"In view of any action involving union between the Anglican and Presbyterian Communions, Bishops and Clergy of the Anglican Communion would accept a form of Presbyterial Commission, and Ministers of the Presbyterian Communion would accept a form of Episcopal Commission. Any who at the time of union may not desire to receive such a commission, entitling them to officiate at all acts of worship in the united Church, would retain their present status and functions." (Compare *Lambeth Report*, p. 143.)

After several meetings both of the joint subcommittee and of the separate committees, the joint committee submitted to the fourth conference forms of reciprocal commission, which, after amendment, were adopted in the following form:

1. *Presbyterian Form of Commission to Anglicans.*

A declaration will be made to the effect that there is no repudiation of or reflection on the Ministry to which we have been set apart by the Holy Spirit, but that the authorization is given to enable us to exercise the Ministry in a wider sphere within the reunited Church. The exact phraseology of this has not been determined.

Then the clergy of the Church of England in Canada will be admitted according to the form in the "Draft of the Book of Common Order of the Presbyterian Church in Canada," pp. 35 and 36, as follows:

Now may be sung "Come, Holy Ghost, our souls inspire," or other hymn of supplication for the presence of the Holy Spirit. Then shall the Candidate kneel, and, other Presbyters standing about him, the Moderator shall say: Since no man is of himself sufficient for these things let us call upon God in prayer.

Let us pray.

Almighty and most merciful Father, who of Thine infinite goodness hast given Thine only Son Jesus Christ to be our Redeemer and the Author of eternal life, and hast exalted Him unto Thy right Hand, from whence, according to Thy will, He hath sent down the Holy Ghost and given gifts

unto men, send down, we pray Thee, the Holy Ghost upon this Thy servant, whom, in Thy name, and in obedience to Thy most blessed will, we now by the laying on of our hands (*Here the Moderator and other Presbyters lay their hands on the head of the Candidate*), admit to a wider exercise of the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments.

We entreat Thee to grant unto Thy servant, to whom this sacred trust is now committed, such fulness of grace as shall fit him more and more for the work to which he has been called. Give him utterance, that he may boldly make known Thy word and will, and faithfully dispense the mysteries of the Gospel. Endue him with wisdom and zeal to rule aright the people over whom Thou hast set him and to preserve them in peace and purity, so that Thy Church, under his administration and example, may increase in grace and holiness. Strengthen him by Thy Spirit, that he may abide steadfast to the end, and be received, with all Thy faithful servants, into the joy of his Lord.

O God, give grace, we beseech Thee, to Thy people to whom Thy servant is to minister in holy things, that they may be enlightened by divine truth, edified by the Ministry of the Word, quickened by the Spirit of Life, established in all holy living, guided into manifold Christian labours, and used for the furtherance of the Saviour's kingdom. May both Minister and People be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation.

Our Father which art in heaven, etc.

Now unto Him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto Him be glory in the Church by Jesus Christ throughout all ages world without end. Amen.

Prayer being ended, the Minister shall rise, and the Moderator, addressing him, shall say :

In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the only King and Head of the Church, and by authority of this Presbytery, I invite you to take part with us in this Ministry, and admit you to all the rights and privileges thereto pertaining.

Then the members of the Presbytery shall give him the right hand of fellowship, the Moderator saying :

We give you the right hand of fellowship to take part with us in this Ministry.

The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you. Amen.

2. *Anglican Form of Commission to Presbyterians.*

STATEMENT.—*The Candidates having been presented to the Bishop, then shall the Bishop say :*

Forasmuch as terms have been arranged between the Church of England in Canada, and the Presbyterian Church in Canada, with the purpose of realizing, through a visible and corporate union, their common fellowship in the Universal Church of Christ, and of manifesting that fellowship to the world, and forasmuch as it is necessary that there should be in this united Church a Ministry that shall be acknowledged in every part thereof, it is our purpose now to give to these our brethren, by the laying on of our hands, a commission to the office of priesthood, it being clearly understood that herein there is no repudiation of, or reflection on, their past ministry, to which they were set apart by the Holy Spirit, whose

call led them to that Ministry and whose power enabled them to perform the same.

INVOCATION.—*Then shall be said or sung, "Come, Holy Ghost,"* etc.

PRAYER.—*Then shall the Bishop say:*

Almighty God and heavenly Father, Who of Thine infinite love and goodness towards us hast given to us Thy only and most dearly beloved Son Jesus Christ, to be our Redeemer and the Author of everlasting life, who, after He had made perfect our redemption by His death, and was ascended into heaven, sent abroad into the world His Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Doctors, and Pastors, by whose labour and ministry He gathered together a great flock in all the parts of the world, to set forth the eternal praise of Thy Holy Name: For these so great benefits of Thy eternal goodness, and for that Thou hast vouchsafed to call these Thy servants here present to the same office and ministry, appointed for the salvation of mankind, to be exercised in the wider sphere of the united Church, we render unto Thee most hearty thanks, we praise and worship Thee, and we humbly beseech Thee, by the same Thy blessed Son to grant unto all, which either here or elsewhere call upon Thy holy Name, that we may continue to show ourselves thankful unto Thee for these and all other Thy benefits, and that we may daily increase and go forwards in the knowledge and faith of Thee and Thy Son, by the Holy Spirit. So that as well by these Thy Ministers, as by them over whom they shall be appointed thy Ministers, Thy Holy Name may be for ever glorified, and Thy blessed kingdom enlarged, through the same Thy Son Jesus Christ our Lord, Who liveth and reigneth with Thee in the unity of the same Holy Spirit, world without end. Amen.

COMMISSION.—*Then the Candidates shall kneel, and the Bishop with the Priests present, shall lay hands severally on the head of every one, the Bishop saying:*

Take thou authority to execute this office now committed to thee by the imposition of our hands. And be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His holy Sacraments. In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

NOTE.—The following was not formally brought before the Conference, but had it been it would doubtless have passed.

1. *Presbyterian Form of Commission to Anglicans.*

STATEMENT.—*The Candidate having presented himself before the Moderator of Presbytery, the Moderator shall say:*

Forasmuch as terms have been arranged between the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Church of England in Canada, with the purpose of realizing, through a visible and corporate union, their common fellowship in the Universal Church of Christ, and of manifesting that fellowship to the world, and forasmuch as it is necessary that there should be in this united Church a Ministry that shall be acknowledged in every part thereof, it is our purpose now to give to this our brother, by the laying on of our hands, a commission to take part with us in this Ministry, it being clearly understood that herein there is no repudiation of or reflection on their past Ministry, to which they were set apart by the Holy Spirit, whose call led them to that Ministry and whose power enabled them to perform the same.

REVIEWS

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON MORAL THEOLOGY

A History of Penance: Being a Study of the Authorities—(A) For the Whole Church to A.D. 450; (B) for the Western Church from A.D. 450 to A.D. 1215. By O. D. Watkins, M.A., Vicar of St. Cross, Holywell, Oxford. Two vols. Pp. 496 + 279. Longmans, Green and Co. London, 1920. 42s. net.

In bringing together in the original texts the authoritative passages for the study of the history of penance from the earliest times, Mr. Watkins has done the Church of England a service which it is impossible to praise too highly. And—in contradistinction to some at least of the studies to which the question has been subjected—his book is singularly unprejudiced (we might almost say impersonal) in dealing with those authorities. Mr. Watkins's method is to divide his whole field into periods and areas; to quote at length the authorities for the *pericope* in view; and then to discuss their bearing with the fulness which only a ripe study of the whole ground makes possible. It would, perhaps, be ungracious to suggest that this method is a little confusing to the reader; the alternation of text and commentary makes necessary a profusion of recapitulations; and in spite of the admirable synoptic table of contents and the two review chapters, we are apt to lose the thread of what is in any case a singularly complex and difficult development.

There are two main problems which confront the student in the growth of the penitential system in the Church. At the beginning of its history we see an almost universal custom of open penance and public restoration, with little if any trace of any private reconciliation of the penitent by the minister; at the end of the period in review (which, as Mr. Watkins quite rightly observes, brings us to the point at which can be seen the fully developed Roman system in all its essentials) public penance and absolution have completely disappeared, and a private discipline is universal. Between these two terminal points an infinite variety of custom is known to have existed; though few except experts can have had any conception of its multiplicity as revealed by Mr. Watkins's exhaustive researches. The first system disappears, the second takes its place; but among the many pioneers who experimented with one form or another of the latter method, which is it to whom most credit for its ultimate victory is due? Where was the system of private confession to, and absolution by, a priest first proved a successful means of dealing with the growing

disinclination of the faithful to submit to public penance—in Constantinople, Rome, or Britain? That is the first problem—a problem in the main of discipline and expediency.

The second problem is really more far-reaching, for it concerns doctrine rather than practice. Tertullian recognized three classes of sins. In the first class were the three mortal sins of impurity, apostasy, and murder, which the Church always regarded—probably on the basis of the Apostolic Decree—as of primary heinousness; with certain others of almost equal degree of criminality. For these sins no remission on earth was possible; Tertullian Catholic reserved them for the mercy of God in judgment, Tertullian Montanist tended to deny their remissibility either in earth or heaven (*horum ultra exorator non erit Christus*—Mr. Watkins has scarcely brought out the significance of this passage). It was the attempt of Callistus to allow absolution to follow penance in the case of the first of these sins which called forth the *de Pudicitia*. A second class was that of sins which, relatively to the first, might be called *leviora*—such sins as attendance at gladiatorial shows or absorption in conviviality. For these excommunication was the inevitable penalty; but the penitent could be readmitted after confession (here, *as always*, the confession itself seems to have been private) and public *exomologesis*, or penance. Lastly comes the class of venial sins, "without which," as Augustine later said, "it is impossible to live." For these the ordinary observances of prayer and a pure life provide sufficient expiation, without any excommunication, discipline, and restoration by the Bishop. With Augustine, Pacian, Cæsarius of Arles, and the moralists in general from the fifth to the seventh centuries, the classification of sins changes, but the principle is the same. The three "capital" sins of impurity, apostasy, and murder once again (as in Hermas' time) are remissible after penance by public reconciliation; these, with others of equal or almost equal heinousness, are classed as *mortalia* or *crimina*, and penance is *necessary* for them. Against them are set the *venialia*, or *peccata* simply, for which no penance is required.

Now, the point of importance does not lie in the fact that, as time went on, the faithful began to seek the ministry of reconciliation for venial as well as for mortal sin; though not, of course, before private penance and reconciliation had taken the place of public, and absolution, even from mortal sin, was allowed to be given more than once in a lifetime. What is important to recognize is that somewhere between the sixth and thirteenth centuries the whole conception of "mortal" sin—sin for which the discipline of penance was necessary—changed completely. In the sixth century it is obviously sin

which causes grave public scandal; with the Schoolmen it is sin which—whether openly known or in the secret recesses of the heart, it matters not—is deliberate opposition to the known will of God. In effect the result may be much the same; but the principle is wholly different. Pacian, indeed, in his *Parœnesis* had mentioned, almost as an afterthought, that "mortal" sins were no less mortal if merely contemplated in the heart; but in general it seems probable that the change of emphasis came later. "Mortal" sin, in other words, was no longer regarded as such because it outraged public morality, but because it outraged personal purity. And this change of conception argues so vast a refinement of the religious consciousness in what we commonly call the Dark Ages, that we are eager to know by what stages it came about.

We earnestly hope Mr. Watkins may be able to devote himself particularly to the tracing out of this development, which indeed is one of exceptional interest. Much of the material for such a study he has provided in his book; but he has limited himself, and wisely—in view of the complexity of the subject—to the elucidation of the first of the two problems referred to. Here, indeed, he more than satisfies us, and establishes, as far as it can be established, the fact that it was from Celtic and British Churches that the system of private penance and absolution spread to the whole Catholic Church. In this conclusion he is, indeed, at issue with both Duchesne and Batiffol; and we should have welcomed a direct consideration of their views; but the book is not controversial, and the student may well be left to make such detailed comparisons for himself. In the same way, it might have made for completeness to have considered the small but weighty body of opinion which sees in the *impositio manuum* before the completion of penance some form of absolution by which conscience might be relieved even though discipline was not relaxed. And it would perhaps have been advisable to indicate the fact that the decree of the Lateran Council has never been regarded officially as *binding* the Christian to the confession of venial sins, however *advisable* it may be regarded by Roman theologians to confess such sins. These, however, are trifling criticisms on what is a genuinely monumental work of scholarship, and we cannot draw attention to them, even in this slight degree, without reminding the reader that he will find in Mr. Watkins's book matter of the utmost interest and importance to which we have made no allusion whatever. This *History of Penance* should rank for many years among the most complete studies of the subject.

K. E. Kirk.

SOME PRINCIPLES OF MORAL THEOLOGY AND THEIR APPLICATION. By Kenneth E. Kirk, Fellow of St. Mary Magdalen College and Tutor of Keble College, Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Sheffield. Longmans, Green and Co. London, 1920. Pp. xxvi+282. 15s. net.

This is a welcome book; something of the kind has long been needed. In the revival of Catholic conceptions of the ministry the clergy have rediscovered the priestly ideal; but they have had little expert advice as to how it should be put into practice. Mr. Kirk's book is certainly the best textbook on its subject available for clergy and ordinands. The writer has shown real courage in his task. Moral theology was until recently practically a dead letter for English Churchmen, although we had some capable exponents of the subject in the seventeenth century. Recently we have had books on "Christian Ethics" and earlier still the Tractarians made some attempts to restore penitential theology. Meanwhile Rome has had a continuous tradition, from which some of our own writers have begun to borrow rather promiscuously. What line must be taken in the work of restoration? Mr. Kirk is clear that it is no use simply copying Rome. We cannot be content to reproduce the legal spirit of her moral system, however much there may be for us to learn from her practical experience. We do not, in fact, bind ourselves by the scholastic philosophy nor by the oracular theory of authority. We must build up a tradition of our own, which will take account of all Catholic thought and yet be English in its form. The significance of this modest book is that its author is practically the first person since Stewart times to attempt this all-important task. Skinner's outline was never really available, and few people can have been satisfied with Bishop Webb's little handbook.

In his first chapter the writer maps out the field for us in a tentative way. He has confined his own work to a few only of the many subjects which might have been treated. He has made a selection to meet the average needs of the clergy. Evidently he has his own predilections; religious and educational psychology occupy a very large share of the book, some may think too large. "Psychological" literature of all kinds is the rage just now. But is it not possible to pay too much attention to the "flashy" theories of men like William James? We must confess to being rather wearied with "the healthy-minded" and their kind. But the fault is on the right side. Moreover, it must not be supposed that this book draws only on modern sources. The author is familiar with the Fathers and St. Thomas

and uses them very effectively. His book is just what such experimental work in a strange field should be—a combination of the old and the new.

The second chapter discusses Christian Character and goes over the well-trodden ground of cardinal and theological virtues. These are given a psychological basis; and there is a useful explanation of that difficult subject, the psychology of the Schoolmen, which has probably proved an obstacle to many a modern reader of St. Thomas. In his quotations from the *Summa* Mr. Kirk's method of annotation is not very clear. The system employed in Dr. Wicksteed's new book on St. Thomas seems preferable (*Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy;* Williams and Norgate). The virtues are treated as the consecration of the leading features of personality, intellect, desire, and will. There is much to be said for this; but it must not be taken too strictly. Of the theological virtues, indeed, it might just as well be said that each of them goes so deep that it pervades every element in personality. Moreover, surely it is a mistake to try and make penitence the equivalent of hope and so to restrict the former to the consecration of desire? If this is done, what becomes of "conviction of sin" and the familiar definition "contrition, confession, and satisfaction"? The limitation does not do justice to what Mr. Kirk actually has to say about the subject. We prefer Hooker's description of the "virtue of penitence" as a process including many stages such as faith, fear, consideration of sin, love, hope, and change of will showing itself through submission to external discipline. Penitence seems, indeed, to be the counterpart of all the theological virtues, representing them on their negative side.

In a note early in the book (p. 49) conscience is defined as a "tendency" which includes equally cognitive, emotional, and conative activities. But does this do justice to the cognitive element? In a chapter on Faith prominence is given to the cognitive aspect of that virtue; it is acknowledged that this is not the whole truth; for faith in its highest exercise seems to move in the dark, as in the Desolation on the Cross. The function of conscience, on the other hand, must always involve acts of judgment, and these seem to be its most characteristic feature. The chapters on Casuistry and on Sin and its Treatment are particularly helpful. There is a clear and sensible discussion of probabilism and its right and wrong uses (pp. 193-197), followed by a collection of simple casuistical rules. Mr. Kirk never allows himself to forget that he is writing mainly for the clergy and others who have pastoral cares. Sin and its remedies are treated with special reference to the work of healing and directing souls. Among remedies for sin the author con-

siders the most hopeful to be the "redirection of instincts." Other features of the book are the prominence given to ascetic theology and to Biblical teaching on some important points. There is a brief reference to the religious life (pp. 30-31), which can hardly be considered satisfactory. The religious life is a vocation for those whose capacities for service can best be liberated in that way, not a refuge for rescuing souls from the world.

Though Biblical standards are prominent, we miss any general discussion of the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God. This is one of the few points on which we might learn from Continental writers such as Martensen and Ritschl. The idea of the Kingdom, so prominent in the Gospels, puts moral questions at once into a social setting. Is there not to-day a subtle danger of treating all moral issues as a series of personal and individual questions? The whole of moral theology in Roman hands has become limited to regulation of the individual conscience, whilst ordinary Protestant ethics are purely personal. We must look for something better. Surely our Lord's Gospel of the Kingdom and the social atmosphere of the early Church tell a very different story.

L. S. Thornton, C.R.

Manuale Theologiæ Moralis secundum Principia S. Thomæ Aquinatis. By Dom M. Prümmer, O.P. Three vols. Herder. 1915.

A Handbook of Moral Theology. By Antony Koch, D.D. Adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss. Five vols. (Vols. I.-III. published). Herder Book Co., 68, Great Russell Street, W.C. 7s. per volume.

Present-Day Problems in Christian Morals. By F. G. Belton, B.A. London: Mowbrays. 8s. 6d.

We need scarcely labour the point that Jesuit spectacles are not the best ones through which an Anglican should survey the field of moral theology. The purpose of Jesuit textbooks is severely practical; their aim is to distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit in conduct as judged in the light of God's law, so that the confessor may be enabled to resolve the difficulties of his penitents. *An Encyclopedia of Doubts and Difficulties with their Solutions* would be a fair title by which to indicate the scope—and the limitations—of such handbooks. There is no doubt that the Roman confessor, guided by that admirable knowledge of human nature (or, at all events, of human nature as it commonly reveals itself in the predominantly

" Catholic " temperament) and the sound and quasi-humorous common sense which as a rule he possesses in abundance, is not likely to become the slave of his handbook. He uses it, we believe, as an occasional work of reference, but by no means as an infallible *vade mecum*. His long training, his experience, and in many cases his supreme fitness for his work, enable him to select and adapt the conclusions of his textbook with a sureness which is all-important for his purpose.

We do not suggest for a moment that the Anglican clergy are less well fitted in character or experience for the task of guiding souls ; but admittedly they are lacking in training and consequently, only too often, in sureness of touch. Many of them, therefore, have in recent years turned to the Church of Rome for guidance in this matter of directing conduct; and it is here that the danger has arisen. To the Roman priest his textbook presents no difficulties—he has been drilled in the use of it, and knows exactly how far it may be followed and at what point it may cease to be of use. To the Anglican, on the other hand, these textbooks commend themselves by the fact that they enshrine the very genuine wisdom and experience of a very wise and experienced communion; whilst the fact that their scope is strictly limited is in no way apparent. So it happens that too often Anglican practice, when based upon Roman textbooks, exhibits the most distressing features—features which we believe to be generally absent from the most experienced practice of Romanism. The *Encyclopedia of Doubts and Difficulties* is treated as though it were a complete and final guide to pastoral work; morality comes to be regarded merely as obedience to a formal code of rules; many of them, as is increasingly being realized, of an arbitrary and irrational kind; and the authority of the priest, or of that undefined body " the Church," is exalted over conscience in a way that would horrify, we believe, the best of our Roman friends.

These dangers will no doubt be dissipated in proportion as the limitations of the textbooks in question become gradually understood. We shall see that they are not in any way the main source of Roman Catholic moral teaching, but only a comparatively small and unimportant by-channel. And it is for the part they play in making this matter clear that we welcome Fr. Prümmer's *Manuale* and Fr. Koch's *Handbook*. Here the study of morals is treated as a whole; questions of casuistry fall into the background; virtue, or advance in Christian goodness, takes the place of legitimacy as the true test of actions; evil is regarded not merely as what is forbidden, but even more as what vitiates our service of God and man. The encyclopedic method of discussion based upon the Decalogue is abandoned

in favour of a scientific analysis of the Christian character and its opposites—Prümmer's classification being the Thomist one of the four cardinal and three theological virtues, Koch's that of our duties towards God, our neighbour, and ourself. Moral theology is defined as the "direction of human actions towards their ultimate end" (Prümmer, vol. i., p. 3; Koch, vol. i., p. 1); and the attitude of the writers towards textbooks of the kind we have been considering is summed up in the admirably ambiguous phrase in which Fr. Prümmer describes the work of Gury: "Forte non existunt opera moralia sæculo xix ita vulgata quam *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis* et *Casus Conscientiæ* a Gury claro et succincto modo conscripta." By both our authors three methods of approaching the subject are recognized—the speculative, the ascetic, and the casuistical; and all three are as far as possible combined in one. Thus the volumes in question are not "books of moral pathology" (the title which Fr. Slater employs to designate the purpose of Roman Catholic manuals), but something much wider and bigger; something, in consequence, of much greater value to the Anglican reader. There is, of course, much that is specifically Roman Catholic, but the attempt is made—not altogether without success—to appeal to reason as well as to authority; we may instance in particular a valuable little discussion in Fr. Prümmer's first volume on "The Genesis of Faith" (pp. 306-308). The decisions of St. Alphonsus Liguori are not quoted as final—Fr. Prümmer quotes with approval Bouquillon's dictum: "Nobis autem justos laudis limites excedere videntur qui ex allatis documentis deducunt S. Alphonsum esse inter moralistas maximum"; and common sense is given a higher place than casuistical systems, of which Fr. Koch says (in echo of Linsenmann): "All the systems thus far devised could be cut out of the body of Catholic Moral Theology without drawing one drop of blood." A word of praise must be spared for the copious references contained in each of these books, and the scholarly reading evinced in them; Fr. Prümmer is evidently a high authority on Scholastic Theology and the Canon Law; Fr. Koch on patristic study and modern thought.

Mr. Belton's valuable little volume is a fitting companion to the two we have been considering. Its first chapter on the "Study of Moral Theology" gives a clear and manageable outline for a scheme of reading within the scope of most Anglican clergy; its later chapters present us with reasoned and Christian solutions of some modern problems, which are advanced—as all theological propositions should be—in the form of tentative opinions to be weighed in the considered judgment of the Church.

Mr. Belton would be the first to admit the limitations of his book; and if we venture to point them out in this brief notice it is in no way as a criticism upon his work, but rather to indicate a fundamental question upon which light is urgently required. Mr. Belton speaks (p. 7) of a "Christian moral code"; but *what*, for the Anglican, is the Christian moral code? Where is he to look for it? How far is it enshrined in laws promulgated by the authority of the Church? How far is it a matter of principles merely to be interpreted by the individual conscience in special cases? However much we may regret the temper and attitude of the Jesuit handbooks, we must confess that—in so far as they are accepted by authority—they do enshrine such a "code"; can the English Church supply anything of a similar nature, or are we to be left to all the honours of individualistic interpretation? Mr. Belton quotes from the New Testament, from St. Thomas, from Jeremy Taylor, from Papal Decrees; but his final authority is his own deduction from these and similar premises. Once, indeed he approaches the problem closely: "What authority have we," he asks, "to teach that a person who omits Sunday Mass without just cause commits sin?" (p. 100). His reply is that "the Church of England professes her loyalty to primitive custom, and we have ample evidence that during the first six centuries the rule of Sunday observance was then what it is now." True enough; but we cannot on that account enforce all the rigours of patristic morality—and much of it was indeed rigorous. Thus Mr. Belton's book opens up, as we are inclined to think it was intended to do, a "previous question," to the solution of which we hope that he will himself bring his gifts of reading, insight, and clear expression: the question as to what moral principles the Church of England does indeed regard as authoritative both in general and in particular. The Lambeth Conference Report leads us to hope than an authoritative expression of opinion by the Bishops on this matter is not beyond the bounds of possibility; it will help towards the realization of this hope if Mr. Belton and those who feel with him the urgency of the need will concentrate their efforts upon producing material of a character similar to that in his present book—which will be available for our authoritative manual if and when it comes.

K. E. Kirk.

NOTICES

RECENT BOOKS ON PSYCHOLOGY

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER. By Alexander F. Shand, M.A. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. London, 1920. One vol. Pp. 570. 20s. net.

In the sixth chapter of his book on logic, Mill discussed the empirical foundations of "Ethology," or the science of Character. This book, which was originally published in 1914, is the foundation-stone of that science. *The Foundations of Character* is an example of the extraordinary fruitfulness of modern psychology when applied to widely different problems. It is, in every way, admirable. In a work of this kind, ease for the reader can only be obtained at the cost of some trouble to the writer. This trouble Mr. Shand has taken, and we have as a result a work which can be read with keen enjoyment by anyone, however little study he may have made of the technicalities of descriptive psychology.

The most important advance made by Mr. Shand in science has probably been his theory of the sentiments, first published in *Mind* and incorporated in this volume. A "sentiment" is one of those greater systems of the character which organize and direct the emotions. Love may be taken as an example of a sentiment. It is not itself an emotion, for it includes in its system a large number of different emotions. In the presence of the object of love we feel joy, in its prolonged absence we feel sorrow, and when it is attacked, anger at its assailant, and so on. Thus joy, sorrow, anger, etc., may all be emotions organized in the sentiment of love. A great clarification of thought results from the recognition of this important distinction between emotion and sentiment. On its mental side, religion is clearly a sentiment.

The relation between emotion and instinct is a question which has attracted a good deal of attention from psychologists during recent years. It will be remembered that in his *Social Psychology*, Dr. McDougall considers that each of the principal instincts conditions a primary emotion whose activity is peculiar to it. In other words, a primary emotion is the affective aspect of the operation of one of the principal instincts. While recognizing the relation between instinct and emotion, Mr. Shand does not consider that the relation is as simple as this. The system of a primary emotion may contain many instincts, and the same instinct may be found organized in the systems of different emotions. Thus the system of the emotion of fear includes the instincts of flight and concealment; and the instinct of flight in birds may be aroused through the emotion of fear or of anger.*

Book II. is a discussion of the tendencies of the primary emotions: of fear, anger, joy, sorrow, disgust, etc. Each of these is found to be the source of qualities in character and conduct. Thus the emotion of fear innately possesses the quality of cowardice, while disinterested fear (fear felt on behalf of others) is a source of courage. Sorrow has different functions in different systems. In the sentiment of love, it stabilizes and strengthens the love, and preserves it when the object is destroyed. Its value is to be judged by its double tendency: to strengthen and perfect the character; and to break the spirit, weakening and degrading the character.

A satisfactory treatment of the emotions has proved to be one of the

* Pp. 190, 191.

least easy of the tasks of psychology. We all remember James's judgment of the classical works on the subject: "I should as lief read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as toil through them again." The second book of *The Foundations of Character* is probably the best work of this kind that has yet been done.

The third and last book discusses the system of desire. A desire is an impulse with the thought of a result or end distinguished from any result already accomplished and from the vague prospective attitude immanent in an impulse. The conclusion of this part of the work is that desires are not independent systems, but subserve the ends of the emotions, impulses, and sentiments from which they spring. It is not, then, through a study of them, but of the systems of the emotions and sentiments that we should approach the problems of the science of character.

This edition has three additional appendices: on impulse, emotion, and instinct; on the expansive and contracting tendencies of joy and sorrow, and on the antagonism of joy and desire, and the distinction between desire and love.

This book makes a very important contribution to scientific psychology. A later volume dealing with the sentiments was promised in the Preface to the first edition, but its completion has been prevented by the war. It is to be hoped that this is only a delay, and not a complete abandonment of the enterprise.

INSTINCT AND THE UNCONSCIOUS. By W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Fellow and Prælector in Natural Sciences, St. John's College, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1920. One vol. Pp. 250. 16s. net.

At a time when the book market is being flooded with obscure and worthless books on psycho-analysis and allied subjects, there is a particularly great pleasure in welcoming a lucid and valuable work. The general aim of *Instinct and the Unconscious* is, as stated in the Preface, "to put into a biological setting the system of psycho-therapy which came to be generally adopted in Great Britain in the treatment of the psycho-neuroses of war." The point of view of Dr. Rivers is that of the psychologists who, with Professor Freud of Vienna, consider that the Unconscious plays a large part in the mental life. Dr Rivers cannot, however, accurately be described as a disciple of Freud. While accepting the Freudian system on the whole, he maintains a critical attitude towards it, and differs from Freud in important particulars. He does not admit that factors from the sexual life generally play any important part in the causation of the mental disorders brought about by the war, but considers that they are explicable as results of the disturbance of the instinct of self-preservation.

The theory of the origin of the psycho-neuroses of warfare which is developed in this book may be briefly explained as follows. Mental health depends on the presence of a state of equilibrium between instinctive tendencies and the forces by which they are controlled. This equilibrium may be upset in war by an increase in the strength of the instinctive tendencies and by a weakening of the controlling forces as a result of fatigue or illness. The psycho-neuroses may be regarded as attempts to restore the balance between instinctive and controlling forces For example, the danger-instinct is normally controlled by the "unwitting" process of "suppression" by which its emotional accompaniment of fear is kept unconscious. When this instinct is intensified by the dangers of war and the control is weakened, the balance can be restored in various

ways. The individual concerned may develop a "witting" process of "repression" to back up the weakened control. In this case he suffers from "anxiety-neurosis." Or he may develop a functional nervous disorder, such as paralysis, which renders him unfit for military service and so removes him from danger altogether.

There are six appendices at the end which are reprints of occasional papers. These include a paper on "The Repression of War Experience," which should be of value to those who are sufferers from the mental effects of war experience, and one on "War Neurosis and Military Training," in which it is argued that the effect of military training is to increase the suggestibility of the private soldier, and that this heightened suggestibility predisposes him to those functional nervous disorders—paralysis, dumbness, etc.—which are labelled hysteria.

This is a book which can be read with enjoyment and profit by the general reader as well as the specialist. Every student who wishes to keep in touch with modern psychology must read it. It is to be hoped that the very much larger number of people whose interest in modern psychology is practical rather than academic will read it too.

THE GROUP MIND: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology, with Some Attempt to apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character. By William McDougall, F.R.S., Late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1920. One vol. Pp. 300. 21s. net.

Dr. McDougall explains in his Preface that this is a sequel to his well-known *Introduction to Social Psychology*. It describes the voyage of exploration of societies, for which the Social Psychology was the carefully packed trunk.

Its title of *The Group Mind* is one which challenges criticism from those to whom the idea of a super-individual mind is repugnant. Mr. Maciver in his *Community* attacks Dr. McDougall for his use of this conception in an earlier work, and Dr. McDougall defends himself against this attack in the Introduction. It seems to be clear from this discussion that the conception which Mr. Maciver is attacking is not the same as the one which Dr. McDougall is defending. Mr. Maciver seems to consider that the use of the group mind implies a belief in a collective consciousness. Dr. McDougall provisionally rejects the conception of a collective consciousness until it can be shown to be necessary for the explanation of observed facts. He defines mind as "an organized system of interacting mental or psychical forces."* His use of the term "group mind" means only that "the society has a mental life which is not the mere sum of the mental lives of its units existing as independent units."† To Dr. McDougall the use of the word "mental" does not imply consciousness.

He insists that the problem of nationality is essentially a psychological one, and it is to their failure to recognize this fact that the failure of writers on the Philosophy of History to deal with it satisfactorily is due. "A nation . . . is a people or population enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character, and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition."‡ Effective national action is made possible by a strong national sentiment

* P. 47. † P. 7. ‡ P. 100.

which is the result of national self-consciousness. This national self-consciousness should be fostered in the same way as the corresponding group self-consciousness is fostered in the Army. Japan and Russia were strong and weak respectively in national self-consciousness, and it was partly this fact that determined the result of the Russo-Japanese War. The rapid increase of national self-consciousness among the peoples of the world is a dominant fact in the present periods of world history.

The third part of the book is a discussion of the development of national mind and character, during the prehistoric and the historic periods. He recognizes a certain truth in Bagehot's distinction between these as the race-making and the nation-making periods respectively.

There are three criticisms of this book which the present reviewer feels inclined to make. The first is that Dr. McDougall does not seem to have sufficiently guarded himself against the principal temptation of a writer who is at the same time scientific and popular—the temptation to speak, as it were, *ex cathedra* when he is merely expressing his private opinion and not drawing scientific deductions. Examples are: his opinion that the introduction of Socialism would benefit the present generation but would injure posterity, his conviction that Great Britain must retain India, and so on. These things may be right or wrong, but they do not follow from his treatment of the group mind. A part of the book sounds like special pleading for the excellence of things as they are, and it is difficult not to feel that an author less satisfied with existing conditions would have used the same general principles to reach different particular conclusions.

Secondly, he seems to do less than justice to the most important practical question connected with national sentiment—the necessity, if civilization is to be saved from destruction, of developing a sentiment for humanity which will extend beyond national limits. The late war has shown us what destruction can be wrought by a narrowly national sentiment. Dr. McDougall expresses sympathy with internationalism in the Preface, but on pp. 177-180 he allows no weight to the very real case against exclusive patriotism.

Thirdly, the tone of Dr. McDougall's references to German scientific work in the Preface, and of certain other references to Germany in the book itself, is to be regretted. Scientific research should be dissociated from the spirit of national rivalry, and it is to be hoped that these passages will be eliminated from a second edition.

These criticisms are not, however, directed against the main intention of Dr. McDougall's book. As a study of Nationality from an empirical psychological point of view, it is a valuable contribution to science. It is probably safe to prophesy that its general principles will remain firm, though later workers will not agree with all of Dr. McDougall's applications of these principles to particulars.

ROBERT H. THOULESS.

THE LESSON OF THE CATACOMBS. By the Rev. A. Henderson. S.P.C.K. London. Pp. 62.

This little book will be welcomed by many. For information about the catacombs has hitherto been hard to come by. The Italian works of De Rossi and Marucchi are beyond the reach of all but a very few, while the English *Roma Sotteranea* of Northcote and Browning is out of print and extremely rare. There has, therefore, long been room for a

book that would bring the results of the researches of great antiquarians before English readers. For the catacombs cannot be neglected by anyone who would gain an insight into Christian life and thought during the first three centuries.

The catacombs are subterranean cemeteries, originally private property, but later on acquired by the Christian community through the formation of Burial Guilds (*Collegia funeratica*). Mr. Henderson tells us that the total length of the galleries in the various catacombs is nearly six hundred miles, and that from three to six millions of bodies were deposited in them during the first three centuries. This latter statement seems incredible. If verifiable it would be of great importance as throwing light on the much-disputed question of the total number of Christians during this period.

The catacombs do not seem to have been used for worship, except for the anniversary services of the martyrs buried in them and in times of persecution. During the persecution of Valerian Pope Sixtus was arrested while addressing the faithful in the Catacomb of Prætextatus, and with his deacons and some of the congregation was carried before the Prefect of the City and promptly condemned to death. On another occasion soldiers built up the entrance to a catacomb on the Via Salaria. "Long afterwards the place was opened up, but when Pope Damasus looked down into the crypt and saw the skeletons with the candlesticks and sacred vessels used in the last Mass of those martyrs, he decided not to disturb their relics, and ordered the wall to be built up again, and there they remain to this day, the actual spot not having since been discovered."

When the persecutions ceased the catacombs gradually ceased to be cemeteries, and became great places of pilgrimage. Afterwards, as the bodies of the more distinguished martyrs were removed to shrines built for them above ground, the catacombs lost their interest for the faithful, their entrances became choked up and their existence forgotten, until they were rediscovered in 1575, when a workman accidentally drove his pick through the roof of one.

It is a pity the book was not constructed on a somewhat larger scale. It is too compressed, the explanations are not sufficiently explanatory, and the grounds on which a conclusion is based are frequently omitted. For instance, we are told that the wooden "mensa" inset in the high altar of St. John Lateran "is the actual altar-table on which the Apostle Peter celebrated the Holy Eucharist in the Oratory of House of Pudens," and there the matter is left. On the other hand, we are given reasons for identifying the *Ampliati* in the Cemetery of Domitilla with the *Ampliatus* of Romans xvi. 8.

But in spite of these blemishes, more or less insuperable, on account of its small size, the book may be heartily commended. The author was educated in Rome and writes with a first-hand knowledge of the subject as well as its literature. The matter is well arranged, and the book contains a number of most interesting plans, diagrams, and illustrations.

C. P. S. Clarke.

BOOK NOTES

The Christian Socialist will find a book after his own heart in Mr. G. C. Binyon's *The Christian Faith and the Social Revolution* (S.P.C.K. Paper, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s. 6d. net). The author tries to bridge the gulf between the expression of Christian and Socialist principles. He is a firm believer that the International Socialist Movement is based upon principles which, whether implicitly or explicitly, are fundamentally Christian. Granted this initial hypothesis, to which, however, it is not always easy to give an unqualified assent, the remainder of this book is a logical outcome of its implications. It contains an account of the kind of revision in a good deal of popular theology which the adoption of Socialist ideas would necessitate. There is much to be said for the author's contention that were Socialism brought within the area of Christian moral interest much of the antagonism between the two would disappear, and a real constructive movement might emerge. It is a book full of vital interest at the present moment.

The Rev. C. C. Dobson, in *The Story of the Empty Tomb* (Thynne: London), sums up with no little skill the results of recent exploration upon the probable site of the tomb of Jesus. He gives an additional charm to his narrative by appealing to his readers' imagination and by constructing an account of the burial which he puts into the mouth of Joseph of Arimathea.

The Vicar of St. John's, Great Marlborough Street, has published some Quiet Day Addresses in a little pamphlet to which he has given the title *Friends out of Sight* (Mowbray, 3s.). Directed with a view to giving comfort to mourners, they give in language at once simple and thoughtful the Catholic teaching concerning the state of the faithful departed and our attitude towards them.

One of the most remarkable signs of the times, at any rate in the sphere of religion, is reflected in the widening of the basis of the S.P.C.K. publication department. The Society has taken on a new lease of life by publishing books which are only indirectly theological, but which bear a great deal upon religion in the broader sense to which the word has recently attained. The *Helps to Students of History* is an admirable series of books. Two of the most recent publications in this series are the late Archdeacon Cunningham's *Monuments of English Municipal Life* (1s. net), and Mr. R. L. Marshall's *The Historical Criticism of Documents* (1s. 3d. net). The task of the historical student is one of the most difficult, consisting as it so often does in reconstructing the life of a period from the scantiest of materials and the minimum of written documents. Dr. Cunningham's book sets forth quite simply and adequately the kind of information which the historian may gather from monuments and the best method of approach to that evidence. His book goes far to prove that history and archæology cannot be divorced, but must work hand in hand. Mr. Marshall describes the methods whereby an historian seeks to estimate the authenticity and value of written documents. He is most encouraging in his estimation of the value of the work done in establishing a true text of the New Testament—"There is only a mere fraction of the whole New Testament concerning which there is any serious textual doubt." His little book should be of great service to all who undertake any original historical research. *Geology and Genesis*, by Canon T. G. Bonney (6d. net) is another S.P.C.K. pamphlet which, despite its somewhat over-technical vocabulary (remedied to a certain extent by the

inclusion of a glossary), will repay the attention of all serious students of religion.

We have received two devotional manuals which, in addition to the distinctive merits of each, display very clearly the difference between the Roman and Anglican genius. *The Christian's Ideal* (Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 2s.) is a little volume of meditations translated from the French. Its aim is "to make God known and loved," and its appeal is to the emotions through the imagination. Mr. Trevelyan's *Prayers for Church and Nation* (Longmans, Green, and Co.) is a manual of intercessory prayer similar in design and purpose to the author's *A Nation at Prayer*. It is equally adaptable for public or private use, and we do not hesitate to commend it to our readers. It is sober and restrained in language, and makes a certain demand upon the intellect and the will as well as the emotions, thus bringing to the work of prayer "the whole man."

It was scarcely to be expected that Mr. H. G. Wells' *Outline of History* should be allowed to pass uncriticized from the religious standpoint. Admirable as the intention of the author was, and difficult as the work of condensation must have been, there are some inexcusable statements which had to be contradicted. Dr. R. Downey has done signal service to religion in calling attention to these mistakes in his *Some Errors of H. G. Wells* (Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1s. net), though, writing as a Roman Catholic, he is a little apt to overstate the case in the opposite direction. Thus he does well to contradict Mr. Wells' theory of the evolution of religion from ancestor worship—an altogether outworn theory—but he is not on such sure ground in dealing with subjects that are still open to discussion, as the origin of the Reformation movement, or the compatibility of Christianity and Socialism. There is, however, a good deal of truth in Dr. Downey's statement: "Mr. Wells declares that in the compilation of his *History* he has consulted many experts; but experts in the study of religion do not seem to have been amongst the number." Dr. Downey has courageously endeavoured to supply this lack.

We have kept till the last two publications of Mr. Heffer (Cambridge, 3s. each). They are *The Voice of the Layman and the Church of the Future*, by Bishop Crick (as he now is), of Rockhampton, and *Christianity and International Morality*, by Mr. Campbell of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin. The former of these two volumes is really two books in one. The Voice of the layman has become audible of late, and Bishop Crick has repeated opinions which have been expressed often enough, though the remedy for the state of affairs which they criticize is yet to be found. The second part of his book is really valuable. In it he attempts to define that "something more" which every parish priest (especially the ex-chaplain) feels he ought to be doing, over and above his routine work, for the establishment of the kingdom of God. Social activities of all kinds form Bishop Crick's solution, and he is bold enough to assert his belief in the desirability of influencing Parliamentary legislation by the formation of a "Christian Social Party" in the House of Commons. Mr. Campbell's book (to which Professor A. H. McNeile contributes an Introduction) asserts the thesis that Christian ethics are equally applicable to nations and individuals. He gives an admirably lucid survey of the development in history of international relationships, and applies the Christian ethic to the principles which underlie the League of Nations. It is an extremely thoughtful essay which will repay careful reading.

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